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Comments
RULE 10b-5: PROTECTION FOR AN
AMORPHOUS CLASS
INTRODUCTION
As a result of the need for nationwide regulation of the secur-
ities market, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 19331 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 To curtail the presence of fraud
in connection with securities transactions, Section 10(b)3 was in-
corporated into the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-54 was
promulgated thereunder in 1942. Basically, the rule prohibits the
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
2. Id. §§ 78a-hh (1970).
3. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of invest-
ors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (b).
4. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ment made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rule 10b-5].
use of any instrumentality of interstate commerce to practice
fraud, in its most liberal interpretation,5 upon any person in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security. Four years after
the promulgation of Rule 10b-5, the Rule was interpreted as pro-
viding a private remedy to persons injured by virtue of its viola-
tion. 6 Recognizing a civil cause of action, the courts were then
faced with the question of who had the right to sue under Rule
10b-5. Although the common law fraud concepts of materiality,
7
privity, reliance,9 and causation10 have been used with varying
degrees of finality1 to delimit the class of persons entitled to sue
5. (We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely be-
cause the alleged scheme does not involve the type of fraud that
is 'usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities.' We
believe that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the
artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or pre-
sent a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical methods should
not provide immunity from the securities laws.
A.T. Brod & Cn. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
6. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. i946),
in which the plaintiffs alleged that they were induced to sell securities they
had owned for less than the true market value as a result of the defendant's
fraud. The court, basing its decision on Section 286 of the Restatement of
Torts, held,
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act,
or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an in-
vasion of an interest of another if; (a) the intent of the enactment
is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as an
individual; and (b) the interest is one which the enactment is in-
tended to protect.
-Id. at 513. This interpretation has been upheld in all of the federal circuits
and recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Superintend-
ent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Kuehnert
v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969); Jordon Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle,
O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968); Doelle v. Ireco Chemicals, 391
F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1968); Elks v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Mathe-
son v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1960).
7. E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th
Cir. 1963); James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R.,
264 F.2d 447 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
8. E.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Joseph v.
Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), af 'd,
198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
9. E.g., Rogen v. Ilikan Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266-68 (1st Cir. 1966); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
10. E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524, 529-
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
11. Privity has been generally repudiated as a requirement. E.g., Jef-
feries & Co. Inc. v. Arkus-Duntov, 360 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Green v. Janhop, 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973); Cochran v. Channing, 211
F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp.
14 (W.D. Ky. 1960). Reliance has also been held as not a prerequisite in
an action under Rule lOb-5. E.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1971); Hanly v. Securities & Exchange
Com., 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d
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under the Rule, the requirement that has clung tenaciously to
limit access to federal courts is the purchaser-seller requirement.12
It was first enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,'3
and is quite frequently referred to as the Birnbaum doctrine.' 4
Stated simply, in order to sue under Rule 10b-5 the plaintiff must
be either a purchaser or seller of securities.
It should be noted at the outset however, that the legal con-
cept, with regard to Rule 10b-5, of who is deemed to be a purchaser
or seller is far different from the lay concept or even the concept
of those terms as used in other sections of the federal securities
legislation.' 5 Persons who hold securities at the time of trial,
but must sell or exchange them later because of practical consid-
erations have been held to meet the purchaser-seller requirement
as "forced sellers."'1 6 Moreover, individuals prevented from con-
sumating a stock purchase for which they have contracted have
been held to meet the requirement as "aborted purchasers.' 7
More recently, the purchaser-seller concept has been broadened
even further to include trust beneficiaries" and offerees of securi-
627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Johns Hopkins Univ.
v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971). But see, Miller v. Steinback,
268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
12. E.g., Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.
1972); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970);
Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999
(1971); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); City National Bank
of Ft. Smith, Ark. v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970); Iroquois In-
dustries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969); Knauff
v. Utah Construction & Mining, 408 F.2d 958 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 831 (1969). For a discussion of the reasons supporting the rule see,
Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Rem-
edy, 24 HAST. L.J. 1007, 1029-34 (1973).
13. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
14. E.g., Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA.
L. REV. 543 (1971); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A
New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Comment, Another De-
mise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?, 25 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970). The standing requirement enunciated in Birn-
baum comprises only one half of the doctrine. The second element, which
will not be discussed in this comment, deals with the nature of the fraud
that is cognizable under Rule lOb-5. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d at 464.
15. Friedman, The Concepts of Purchase and Sale Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 608 (1968).
16. Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
17. Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
18. James v. Gerber Products Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Hey-
man v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
ties under a consent decree.19 By virtue of this broad construc-
tion of the purchaser-seller requirement, the requirement has been
criticized by jurors20 and writers21 alike.
It must further be established that in some situations the
purchaser-seller requirement has been entirely eliminated. Indi-
viduals suing derivatively22 and those seeking injunctive relief23
have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 even though they do not
allege that they are purchasers or sellers. And one circuit court
of appeals has explicitly repudiated the requirement in damage
actions.
24
This comment will portray the Rule 10b-5 law of standing
and the analysis the judiciary has employed to identify the class
of persons entitled to sue under the Rule. It will also comment
on the effects that recent cases have had on either expanding or
limiting the class of persons entitled to invoke the Rule's protec-
tion. Specific instances of inconsistency among the circuit courts
will be identified and a possible solution to the conflict will be
offered.
THE BIRNBAUM DOCTRINE
In Birnbaum, stockholders of the Newport Steel Corporation
brought an action on behalf of the corporation and all similarly
situated stockholders for alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. It was alleged that the
Newport Steel Corporation was in the hands of one Feldman who
owned approximately forty per cent of the common stock of the
corporation, and served as president and chairman of the board of
directors. In the latter part of 1950, Feldman sold his stock to
the Wilport Company at a substantial premium and in disregard of a
merger offered by the Follansbee Steel Corporation to the New-
port Steel Corporation which would have been very profitable to
the shareholders of Newport. Feldman falsely represented in let-
ters to the shareholders of Newport that the negotiations for mer-
ger with the Follansbee Corporation had been terminated because
of fluctuating international conditions. The district court dis-
missed the action under Rule lOb-5 holding that the Rule is not
aimed at breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders and
that only fraud upon purchasers or sellers of securities is cogniz-
able under the Rule. On appeal, Circuit Judge Augustus Hand af-
firmed the trial court's decision reasoning that Rule 10b-5 was
19. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, CCH FaD. SEc. L. REP.
94,191 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1973).
20. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
21. See Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New
Era for lob-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
22. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
23. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F. 2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
24. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,344 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973).
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promulgated in order to close a statutory loophole in which sellers
of securities had formerly not been protected against fraud.25
Furthermore, he renounced the appellant's argument that the rule
extended to protecting investors from mismanagement by corpo-
rate insiders and held that the Rule "extended protection only to
the defrauded purchaser and or seller.
'2
As a consequence of the Birnbaum holding, courts generally
require the plaintiff who brings an action for damages under Rule
lOb-5 to allege that he either purchased or sold securities pursu-
ant to a fraudulent scheme.2 7 However, this requirement has
been applied flexibly.
EXPANSION OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER CONCEPT
A. "Forced purchaser-seller" cases.
One of the departures from a strict application of the pur-
chaser-seller requirement is based on the concept of a "forced"
purchase or sale of securities and usually involves two distinct sit-
uations. The first of these is where the courts look to the practi-
cal consequences of the allegations of the complainant and hold
that for purposes of the statute the plaintiff is deemed to be a
seller even though he has not sold any securities. This analysis is
enunciated in a line of cases based on Vine v. Beneficial Finance
Company.28 In Vine, the defendant corporation acquired stock in
a corporation in which the plaintiff was a minority stockholder.
The defendant corporation had statutory authority to merge the
two corporations in a short form merger without the approval of
shareholders of plaintiff's corporation, thus leaving the plaintiff
with the option of either exchanging his stock pursuant to the
merger plan or exercising his statutory right of appraisal. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that in such a case the plain-
25. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d at 463.
26. Id. at 463-64.
27. Shareholders who merely allege corporate mismanagement with
respect to a sale or purchase of control of the corporation by the defendant
uniformly are denied standing. E.g., Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305
(2d Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Erling v.
Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970). A holder of securities that had de-
creased in value due to defendant's corporate mismanagement likewise is
denied standing. Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968). Further-
more, persons alleging that tender offers had failed due to the fraud of the
defendants upon third parties are held to lack standing. E.g., H.K. Porter
Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Iroquois Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969). But see
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
28. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
tiff was a seller of securities for the purpose of Rule lb-5. The
holding was based on the analysis that "[s] ince, in order to realize
any value for his stock appellant must exchange the shares for
money from appellee, as a practical matter appellant must even-
tually become a party to a 'sale' as that term has always been
used."29
This analysis was followed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Coffee v. Permian Corporation,"" in which the plaintiff
alleged that he was a shareholder of a corporation that was to be
liquidated pursuant to a fraudulent scheme. Although the court
adopted Vine's "practical consequences" analysis, holding that the
liquidation of the corporation would force Coffee to become a
seller, it warned that Coffee may not be a "forced seller" within
the meaning of the Vine case if at trial it was found that the
corporation was not actually liquidated.31 With this caveat, the
court emphasized the requirement that a disposition of securities
by the plaintiff must take place in order to bring a successful ac-
tion under Rule 10b-5.
The second situation encompassed by the forced purchaser or
seller concept involves factual settings where the plaintiff is com-
pelled, for one reason or another, to purchase or sell securities. In
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,3 2 Crane, a substantial
holder of Westinghouse stock, made a tender offer to the share-
holders of Westinghouse. However, the success of the tender offer
was thwarted due to the fraud of the defendants upon the share-
holders of Westinghouse in inducing them not to tender their
stock. Instrumental in the fraudulent scheme was a third corpo-
ration, Standard, which subsequently merged with Westinghouse.
Crane, by virtue of its substantial holdings of Westinghouse stock,
thereby became a substantial shareholder of Standard. Because
Crane and Standard were competitors, Crane was compelled to sell
most of its Standard stock under threat of an antitrust suit. The
court held that Crane "was one of the class of persons intended to be
protected" by the Rule and that Crane was in a situation analogous
to that of the dissenting shareholders in Vine since Crane was forced
to sell the securities.33
In Jefferies & Co., Inc. v. Arkus-Duntov,3 4 an analogous situa-
29. Id. at 634.
30. 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970).
31. Id. at 386. See also Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Finance
Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
32. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 794. While Crane technically falls within the "forced seller"
rationale, numerous courts have not interpreted the decision so restrictively.
Those courts base their approach on certain language in the decision that
may warrant a more liberal interpretation of the case. See, e.g., Tully v.
Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972); H.K. Porter Co.
Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972).
34. 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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tion was presented, except the plaintiff in that case was forced
to purchase rather than sell securities. In Jefferies the defendant
ordered the plaintiff, a broker with a seat on the New York Stock
Exchange, to sell stock. However, due to the fraud of the defend-
ant upon the purported purchaser of the securities, the plaintiff
was unable to consummate the transaction. Because the plaintiff
had already issued checks for the contemplated proceeds in the
mistaken belief the transaction would be completed, he was com-
pelled to keep the stock. The court simply held that the plaintiff
was an "involuntary" purchaser of the securities.
3 5
The court in Jefferies relied in part on a decision reached in
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,36 in which the plaintiffs, also brokers,
were ordered to buy stock for the defendants who secretly in-
tended to pay for the order only if the price of the stock rose.
The price of the securities fell and the defendants refused to pay
for the stock. The plaintiffs then sold the securities at a loss.
The court declared in a footnote that the plaintiff was "clearly a
purchaser of securities," even though he exercised no conduct nor-
mally associated with a typical purchase of securities.
3 7
Examining the fact situations of these "forced purchaser-
seller" cases, there are certain salient features. First, the fraud
complained of need not be aimed at the plaintiff, although it often
is. This was certainly true in Crane and Jefferies. Second, the
"forced" transaction need not be the essential purpose of the
fraud, although again it often is. In Crane the fraudulent purpose
was to preclude Crane from successfully completing his tender
offer.38 In Brod the essential purpose of the scheme was to pro-
vide the defendants with a fail-safe method of profitably buying
stock.3 9 With this in mind, the question becomes to what extent
does the fraud have to cause the forced transaction. There is
disagreement as to where the line should be drawn.
In Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,40 the de-
fendant, president of a defunct bank, through a misuse of bank
funds in stock market speculation, brought the bank to financial
collapse, thereby necessitating liquidation of the bank. The plain-
tiffs, shareholders of the defunct bank, argued in part that by
virtue of the liquidation they became "forced sellers" as that
35. Id. at 1213.
36. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
37. Id. at 397, n.3.
38. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.
1969).
39. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
40. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
term was used in Vine, Coffee and Dudley. The court rejected
the argument, stating that:
Each of these "forced seller" cases possesses elements not
present in the case before us. In each case, the majority
shareholder of a corporation or other insiders were taking
advantage of its minority shareholders. In each, the fraud-
'ulent scheme was an integral part of the forced sale and the
transaction attacked. In each, the fraudulent scheme was
directly related to and in connection with the forced sale.
On the other hand, in this case the purpose of Schotte (the
president) and the brokers was not to achieve a forced sale
of the bank stock. The alleged fraud of the brokers was not
in connection with the putative "forced sale" in the bank
liquidation.
42
Not only does this analysis fail to consider and seems to be incon-
sistent with the holding in Crane, it is most definitely contrary to
the language used in Vine in which the court held that the plain-
tiff "would never be in the position of a forced seller were it not
for the fraud. '43 Thus Vine uses "but for" type of analysis
whereas Landy requires a direct causal connection, effectively
proven by the elements of intent and purpose by the defendant
to have the plaintiff sell securities. Consequently, Landy seems
to restrict the scope of the "forced purchaser-seller" concept. In-
stead of recognizing that the concept can be applied to cases simi-
lar to Crane, Brod, and Jefferies, the Third Circuit Court strictly
construes Vine, Coffee and Dudley, thereby limiting the class pro-
tected.
B. Aborted Transactions.
A second modification of the Birnbaum doctrine involves cases
where a contemplated securities transaction has been aborted
due to the fraud of the defendant. The cases categorized herein
fall into two groups speciously distinguished by virtue of their an-
alyses. One group is composed of cases which analyze the issue in
terms of the existence of a contractual relationship between the
parties without expounding upon the reason why such a rela-
tionship is important. 44 The other group consists of cases where
the analysis is based on the causal connection between the alleged
41. Id. at 143.
42. Id. at 159.
43. Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d at 635.
44. Although the statutory definitions of the words "purchase" and
"sale" are seldomly referred to in resolving who is a purchaser or seller for
purposes of Rule lOb-5, see S.E.C.. v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453,
466-67 (1969), it seems that to use the definitions as an analytic tool in the
breach of contract cases would be appropriate as "sale" is defined in the
statute to "include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of securities,"
15 U.S.C. § 78c (14) (1970), and purchase is defined to "include any contract
to buy, purchase or otherwise acquire securities .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78c(13)
(1970). See generally, Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment,
23 ALA. L. REv. 542 (1971).
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fraud and the injury suffered by the plaintiff and on the exist-
ence of a contractual relationship or its functional equivalent.
The pure contractual relationship analysis was first illustrated
in the relatively simple factual setting of Opper v. Hancock Se-
curities Corp.45 In that case the plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant, a broker, failed to carry out the plaintiff's order to sell securi-
ties. The court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff, holding quite
simply that there was a contract for the broker to sell.40  The
nature of the analysis did not become definitive until later when
courts, in construing other cases involving aborted transactions,
looked for a "contractual relationship" such as found in Opper be-
fore holding that a plaintiff had standing. Thus, the court held
that the plaintiff in Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. 0. M. Bell,47
who alleged that he was merely precluded from bidding on and
purchasing securities at a sheriff's sale because of the fraud of the
defendant, lacked standing by virtue of the fact that there was no
contractual relationship. 8  In Lanning v. Sherwold,4
9 the plain-
tiff alleged that he attempted to buy 500 shares of Paulsbo Rural
Telephone Association from minority shareholders but that he was
prevented from doing so because of deceptive letters mailed to the
offerees by the defendant. The court held that because Lanning
had no contractual relationship with anyone either as a purchaser
or seller, he had no standing with respect to these shares.50 How-
ever, Lanning also alleged that he contracted to purchase 136
shares from two women, but that due to the fraud of the defend-
ant the women attempted to rescind the contract. This resulted in
Lanning incurring expenses by having the contract enforced. The
court allowed the plaintiff to recover for the loss incurred be-
cause it found with respect to the 136 shares a prior contractual
relationship.5 1
In both Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co.,
52 and Commerce Report-
ing Co. v. Puretec, Inc.,53 only the causal connection between the
alleged fraud and the aborted transaction is emphasized. Good-
man involved a broker who fraudulently represented to the plain-
tiff that sales of securities were being made when in reality no
45. 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).
46. Id.
47. 464 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 340.
49. 474 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1973).
50. Id. at 718.
51. Id. at 718. Accord, Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393
(9th Cir. 1973).
52. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
53. 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
sales were made. In addition, the defendant was selling to the
plaintiff non-existent securities. The court, holding that the plain-
tiff had standing, reasoned that "the plaintiffs were actual par-
ties to transactions which for the fraud of Rubloff would have
been actual purchases or sales. ' '54 The District Court in Commerce
Reporting held that,
... it is unnecessary to prove a consummated, or closed,
purchase or sale as a condition to the institution of such
suit [under Rule lOb-5]. Here . . . the plaintiffs allege
in substance but for the defendant's fraud, their purchase
of stock. . would have been consummated. 55
Thus, these cases purport to emphasize the causal connection be-
tween the defendant's fraud and failure of the transaction to take
place. However, the lack of importance of the causal connection
independent of other factors becomes apparent when one consid-
ers the frustrated tender offer cases in which it is generally held
that the frustrated offeror has no right to sue.5 6 If the only fac-
tor that was required was a "but for" causal connection bet,, ween
the defendant's fraud and the failure of a consummated transac-
tion, the tender offer cases would clearly meet it because securi-
ties transactions would be complete but for the fraud of the de-
fendant. Thus, it is evident that more than a mere "causal con-
nection" is required. It is the presence or absence of this addi-
tional element that will determine whether the plaintiff's case will
be dismissed. The question is whether a contractual relationship
alone between plaintiff and defendant is the added element. Due
to the fact that courts rarely refer to the statutory definitions of
the terms purchase and sale in support of their "contractual rela-
tionship" analysis, 57 it is at most questionable. In Manor Drug
Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps s the court held that it was not, as
long as there was a relationship that acted as a "functional equiv-
alent" to contractual relationship.59
In Manor Drug, the defendant corporation, in conjunction with
a consent decree, offered to the plaintiffs a specified percentage
of the capital stock of the corporation. The offering was to be
made in units of three shares of common stock and a $100 de-
benture for the price of $101. Each unit had a fair market price of
$315. Through the fraud of the defendant, the plaintiffs failed to
purchase the units to which they were entitled and they brought
54. Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
55. Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715, 718-19
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
56. E.g., H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st
Cir. 1973); Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1969). See also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787 (2d Cir. 1969).
57. See note 44.
58. CCH. Fm. SEc. L. REP. 94,191 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1973).
59. Id. at 94,820.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
an action under Rule 10b-5 when the securities subsequently ap-
preciated in value. In finding that the plaintiff had standing the
court construed the purchaser-seller standing requirement as rest-
ing upon two considerations: (1) the effectuation of the legisla-
tive intent to protect the purity of securities transactions, and
(2) the assumption that an allegation of a purchase or sale by the
plaintiff will ensure adequate proof of loss and causal connection
with the alleged fraud.60 The court reasoned that as to the second
consideration the requirement of contractual relationship will serve
the same function, thus eliminating the reason and need for the
purchaser-seller requirement.
Such contracts often furnish objective evidence of the
reality of a plaintiff's intention to purchase or sell but for
the fraud, and thus of causation. They may also fix the
price, quantity, and time of sale, thus making it possible
to calculate damages.
61
The court then held that the consent decree fulfilled the same
function of ensuring adequate objective proof of loss and causa-
tion, as well as preventing the possibility of ruinous liability since
there were only a limited number of offerees. Therefore, the
court continued, the relationship arising out of the consent decree
should be accorded the same position as a basis for standing to
frustrated purchasers as the contractual relationship.
62
Although Manor Drug looks to the "contractual relationship"
line of cases for support, it extends the scope of their holding
one step further and bases it on an analysis not present in those
cases.63 In all the cases where the plaintiff was deemed to have
standing even though the stock transaction that was the object
of the complaint was aborted, the plaintiff was more than a mere
offeree of securities. 64 In Manor Drug the plaintiffs were mere
offerees under a consent decree who decided not to purchase the
offered securities and are now coming into court because they
realized that they failed to take advantage of an economically
beneficial opportunity.
60. Id. at 94,818.
61. Id. at 94,819-820.
62. Id. at 94,820. Circuit Judge Huftedler voiced a vociferous dissent
denouncing the "functional equivalent" analysis of the majority and attack-
ing the assumptions underlying the analysis. Id. at 94,820 (dissenting
opinion).
63. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, CCH Fxu. SEC. L.
REP. 94,191 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1973) (dissenting opinion).
64. See, e.g., Lanning v. Sherwold, 474 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1973); Opper
v. Hancock Securities Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Commerce Report-
ing Co. v. Puretec Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Goodman v. H.
Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Il. 1967).
Although the court in Manor Drug finds solace in the fact
that a functional equivalent of a contractual relationship permits
a reasonable circumscription of a defendant's potential liability,65
it fails to take into account the multifarious types of securities
transactions that would meet the "functional equivalent" test and
constitute a squal upon the floodgates of the judiciary as they
would enable the parties engaged in these transactions to sue un-
der the Manor Drug theory. The most notable of these would be
options and warrants whereby the holder of the option or warrant
would be able to refrain from exercising his right to purchase,
and then, when the price of the security rises after his option or
warrant has expired, bring an action for damages under Rule lOb-5
claiming that but for the fraud of the defendant he would have
purchased securities. In such a case, the offeree, like the offeree
under a consent decree, would be able to illustrate easily that he is
within the class of persons to be protected as the purity of a stock
transaction was violated. Moreover, there would be easily ascer-
tainable proof of loss and causation as the price, quantity and time
of sale are fixed. Furthermore, he would be in an even stronger
position than an offeree under a consent decree as the enforce-
ability of a consent decree by the beneficiary of the decree is de-
batable,66 whereas the holder of an option or warrant possesses
definitive legal rights.
A variation of the option device that would also meet the
"functional equivalent" test of Manor Drug is the "down and out"
option that is now being traded. This device not only sets a price
and expiration date for the exercise of the option, but provides
that if the market price of the security goes down to a specified
level, the option terminates. If the stock goes down, you're out.
With such a device, the offeree who is precluded from purchasing
the security because its price hit the cut off level as a result of the
fraud of the defendant would be able to establish standing on the
Manor Drug theory and profitably sue if the price of the secur-
ity escalates. Other persons who would have standing under this
analysis would include offerees participating in an employee stock
option program, former holders of convertible securities, share-
holders of corporations which provide optional reinvestment
plans, 7 and shareholders who have pre-emptive rights.6 8  Al-
65. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,191 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1973).
66. Id. at 94,821.
67. See AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO., PROSPECTUS (May 9,
1973) and SUPPLEMENT (Sept. 24, 1973).
68. See Hardy v. Sanson, 356 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1973), in which
the court held that,
the only incident alleged in the present case resembling a proposed
sale and purchase agreement was the thirty day pre-emptive right
extended to plaintiff Tallant. Tallant, however, simply failed to
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though the legal relationship between these people and their re-
spective offerors are distinguishable, this is not determinative as
the analysis of Manor Drug does not depend upon the strength
of the legal bonds. On the contrary, the analysis is totally depend-
ent upon whether the relationship is a functional equivalent of a
contractual relationship; and the function is to provide the court
with objective evidence of causation and loss.6 9 The consequence
of such situations is that offerors under the various devices would
be under a duty to a class of investors to whom no duty would be
owed under a more rigid adherence to the purchaser-seller re-
quirement.
C. De Facto Sellers
Another area in which courts will grant standing to non-pur-
chasers and nonsellers involves situations where the interest of the
plaintiff in securities that are traded is so great that the courts
will grant the complainant standing even though the complainant
is not involved directly in any transaction. These cases may appro-
priately be entitled "de facto seller" cases by virtue of the close
connection between the sale of the securities and the plaintiff.
One situation involves a trust beneficiary's right to sue when
the trustee has sold securities pursuant to a fraudulent scheme.
The two cases holding that the beneficiary has standing, James
v. Gerber Products Co.,70 and Heyman v. Heyman,71 base
their decisions on an analysis that is restricted and seems to be
limited only to the trust beneficiary situation. In Heyman the
court held that although the beneficiary was not the seller, "she
was one who immediately stood to gain or lose by the sale ...
[She] was the beneficiary of the sale. That is the nexus missing
in the line of cases which follow Birnbaum.''72 In James the court
restricted its analysis in the same manner as did the Heyman court
and held that the beneficiary "had the interest of a de facto seller.
In this respect she is much closer to the transaction than the
plaintiffs in the Birnbaum case."73
exercise his right within the designated period and there was no al-
legation that this failure was in any way owing to fraud on the part
of defendants.
Id. at 1039.
69. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, CCH FmD. SEc. L. REP.
94,191 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1973).
70. 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
71. 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
72. Id. at 965.
73. James v. Gerber Products Co., 493 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973). Contra,
Ripper v. Denver United States Nat. Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704 (D. Colo. 1966).
The other de facto seller situation is exemplified by Cambridge
Capital Corp. v. Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis,7 4 in
which securities were sold at a sheriff's sale and the plaintiff pos-
sessed prior to the sale a security interest in the securities sold.
The court reasoned that because of the security interest "the plain-
tiff held many of the normal rights and indicia of ownership with
respect to the securities," and that as a result, he qualified as a
seller of securities.
76
The analysis used by the courts in both of the de facto seller
situations seems to be fashioned for the particular factual pattern
in which they were used and therefore incapable of extrapolation
to other factual settings. With regard to the trust beneficiary sit-
uation, there are no other legal devices so closely analogous to a
trust that the rationale of either the Heyman or Gerber cases can
be applied without changing them. Similarly, the "indicia of own-
ership" held by a secured creditor is peculiar to the secured trans-
action situation. Although the analyses of these cases seemingly
fail to provide precedent for an expansion of the class, protected by
Rule 10b-5, it is questionable whether the concept of seller should
be construed so broadly as to include trust beneficiaries. One of
the underlying rationales of the purchaser-seller requirement is
that it precludes federal securities legislation from encroaching
upon the jurisdiction of the States with regard to traditionally lo-
cal affairs. This is most often expressed in cases imvolving corpo-
rate mismanagement. In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co.,7 6 the Supreme Court maintained that "Con-
gress by 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which
[amount] to no more than internal corporate mismanagement.
'77
Since the regulation of trusts traditionally has been a state func-
tion and both of the trust beneficiary cases involved mere breaches
of the trustee's fiduciary duty the argument could be made that by
allowing the beneficiary to bring a cause of action under Rule lOb-
5 the judiciary would be expanding federal securities legislation
beyond its bounds. Consequently, it appears that the de facto seller
rationale, although palatible to our sense of justice, stands opposed
to the function of the purchaser-seller requirement to keep the
federal judiciary from meddling in traditionally local affairs.
D. Shareholders of Merged Corporations
The courts have uniformly held that a shareholder of a corpo-
ration that is merged into another corporation has standing to sue
under Rule l0b-5.78  In SEC v. National Securities,79 the court
74. 350 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1972).
75. Id. at 833-34.
76. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
77. Id. at 12.
78. E.g., S.E.C. v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Mader
v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 903 (1969);
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adopted the following reasoning to support its conclusion:
Whatever the terms 'purchase' and 'sale' may mean in
other contexts, here an alleged deception has affected
individual shareholders' decisions in a way not at all unlike
that involved in a typical cash sale or share exchange.
The broad antifraud purposes of the statute and the rule
would clearly be furthered by their application to this
type of situation. 0
Although the presence of conduct approximating a typical invest-
ment decision seems to be the focal point of the National Securi-
ties case,8 ' the other merger cases reach their result on an analy-
sis of the broad statutory definition of the terms "purchase" and
"sale. '8 2 The court in Dasho v. Susquehanna Corporation"' em-
phasized that the acquisition or disposition of securities in the
merger situation is encompassed in the statutory definition of pur-
chase and sale. 4 Therefore, the principal difference between the
two analyses is based upon the element of volition on the part of
the plaintiff being affected by the defendant's fraud. In Na-
tional Securities the fraud on the part of the defendant which in-
fluenced the plaintiff's investment decision was crucial; whereas,
the existence of some sort of securities transaction is determinative
in Dasho. Although the two analyses lead to the same result with
respect to similar situations, the two analyses are opposed and may
lead to different results in some cases depending on which analysis
is used.
The element of volition was seized upon as controlling in In
re Penn Central Securities Litigation.85 In that case the plaintiffs
were shareholders of the Penn Central Corporation which had un-
dergone an upward merger. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that
the plaintiffs met the purchaser-seller requirement of Rule 10b-5
as the securitities which they held after the upward merger gave
them economic and legal rights which were substantially different
than they had before the upward merger. Although this argu-
ment would be plausible under the analysis used by the court in
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967). See also Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 473 F.2d 537 (8th
Cir. 1973), where shareholders of the surviving corporation were deemed to
have standing. The action, however, failed on other grounds.
79. 393 U.S. 454 (1969).
30. Id. at 467.
81. S.E.C. v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. at 467.
82. Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d at 160-61; Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,
380 F.2d at 266. See note 44.
83. 380 F.2d 262.
84. Id. at 266.
85. 357 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Dasho, since there the court looked to the change in securities
held by the plaintiff, it fails under the National Securities analy-
ses. Relying on National Securities, the court in Penn Central re-
jected the plaintiff's argument because, the court held, the change
of legal and economic rights was not affected by any investment
decision made by the plaintiff.8 6 This analysis is questionable.
Exercise of investment decision is not a prerequisite for standing
under the Birnbaum rule.87 In the "forced seller" line of cases
this element was certainly missing.8 8
The decision of the case is good however. If the arguments
of the plaintiff were upheld, innumerable situations would be
brought in the ambit of Rule 10b-5 that were not intended to be
governed by the rule. For example, any substantial internal cor-
porate action, such as the issuance of securities 9 or the reorgani-
zation of the corporation would affect the legal and economic
rights of its shareholders, thereby providing the shareholders
with a remedy under Rule 10b-5 if the Penn Central decision was
contrary.
ABANDONMENT OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER REQUIREMENT
A. Injunctive Relief
The purchaser-seller requirement was first abandoned when
courts began to distinguish the nature of the remedy sought by
the plaintiff. The distinction and its ramifications were made
clear in Mutual Shares v. Genesco9° where it was held that the
failure to purchase or sell securities is not a defect that would
preclude standing in a suit for injunctive relief.9 ' This was
based on two theories: (1) in a suit for injunctive relief the
problems of proof of damages and causation are avoided and, (2)
for policy considerations investors would be aiding the SEC in
enforcing the securities lawsY2 Although the court in Mutual
86. Id. at 873.
87. In Condon v. Richardson, 275 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Ill. 1967), it was
held that a sale under Rule 10b-5 is "any transaction which partakes of the
character of a sale in its impact on the interests of a corporation and its
shareholders .... " Id. at -. See Friedman, The Concept of Purchaser
and Sale Under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 608, 615-18
(1968).
88. See notes 28-43 and accompanying text supra.
89. This possibility is not as far fetched as it seems. In both Coffee
v. Periman Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970), and Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d
467 (5th Cir. 1973), the respective plaintiffs argued in part that the change
of his equity interest caused by the fraud of the defendant was sufficient
by itself for them to meet the purchase-seller requirement.
90. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
91. Id. at 546. See Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1964), and S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180
(1963), in which it was held that "it is not necessary in a suit for equitable
or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for
monetary damages." Id. at 193.
92. Mutual Shares v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540, 546-47. See Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Fielding, 309 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Nev. 1969),
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Shares failed to explicitly hold what was required to establish
standing in a suit for injunctive relief, the requirement that direct
causal connection exist between a purchase or sale of securities
and the plaintiff's injury seems to be establishing itself.
93
Recognizing the distinction that the judiciary makes between
an action for damages and a suit in equity, it is important to ques-
tion whether the reasons which support that distinction are im-
portant enough to justify its continuation. The District Court
of Utah in Young v. Seaboard CorpY4 held that they were not and
that the distinction was therefore invalid.9 5 In Young the plain-
tiffs were shareholders of a defunct bank and alleged the defend-
ants fraudulently sold certificates of deposit for $1 million and an
illegal finders fee and then used a substantial portion of the de-
posits to make bad loans to the designees of the defendants
thereby rendering the bank insolvent.9 6 The court held, basing
its decision on the holding in Vincent v. Moench,97 which involved
a suit for injunctive relief, that the plaintiffs had standing as
there was an unbroken chain linking the defendant's alleged
fraud, the plaintiff's loss and the deposit transactions which them-
selves constituted a purchase and sale of securities.9 8  Even
though the Circuit Court in Vincent was concerned with a suit for
injunctive relief, the District Court in Young claimed that the lan-
guage used by the Circuit Court "suggests" that the question of
who may sue in damage actions as well as in injunctive suits should
be decided by applying a causal analysis and the law of dam-
ages rather "than through the erection of standing barriers sup-
posedly anchored in the statute itself but which are frequently
elbowed aside."99 If District Judge Anderson, speaking for the
court in Young is correct in his interpretation of the Vincent
cert. denied, - U.S. - (1971), in which the plaintiff brought an equitable
suit for restitution and was granted standing on the analysis that in suits
in equity the plaintiff need not be a purchaser or seller.
93. Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Tully v. Mott Su-
permarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972). See, e.g., G.A.F. Corp. v.
Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Ka-
han v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970); Greater Iowa Corp. v. Mclendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
94. 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973).
95. Id. at 494. See Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834
(D.N.J. 1972), which involved a suit for injunctive relief and the court held
that standing should not be dependent upon the remedy sought. Id. at 840.
96. The fact situation presented in this case is hauntingly similar to
that in the Landy case. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
97. 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973).
98. Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. at 494-95.
99. Id. at 494-95.
case, the Tenth Circuit Court of the United States has overruled
the Birnbaum rule. The requirements for standing would then be
the existence of a purchase or sale of securities, not necessarily
by the plaintiff, touching a fraudulent scheme cognizable under
Rule 10b-5 causing loss to the plaintiff.
The effects of such a causal test as applied by the District
Court of Utah are omnipotent. The right to sue would belong to
an enlarged class of persons. Under the purchaser-seller require-
ment the minority shareholders of a corporation traditionally were
denied standing where the holders of control of the corporation
sold pursuant to a fraudulent scheme.100 However, under the
causal analysis such minority shareholders would be able to bring
an action for damages providing they could meet the causal re-
quirement and allege the type of fraud proscribed by Rule 10b-5.
Another area in which plaintiffs were traditionally denied stand-
ing to sue for damages because they did not meet the purchaser-
seller requirement involves aborted tender offers. 10 However,
under the analysis used in Young, some of the cases may have
been decided differently. In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse
China Corporation10 2 the alleged fraudulent scheme employed by the
defendants to resist the tender offer included the purchase by the
defendants of the shares of any shareholder who wanted to ac-
cept the tender offer. Thus, upon allegations of loss and causal
connection between such loss and the fraudulent purchase of the
shareholders stock by the defendant, the situation in Iroquois meets
the formula for standing set out in Young. On the other hand,
the plaintiff in H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co. 0 3
would probably be denied standing even if the analysis of Young
was used as the requirement that the loss be caused by the pur-
chase or sale of securities is missing.0 4 In that case the alleged
fraudulent scheme involved merely the issuance of false and mis-
leading statements by the defendants to the stockholders rather
than the purchase of stock as in the Iroquois case. Consequently,
100. E.g., Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972); Herpich
v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th
Cir. 1970); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
101. E.g., H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st
Cir. 1973); Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1969). See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787
(2d Cir. 1969).
102. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969).
103. 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
104. See note 94 and accompanying text supra. Although the court in
Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973), does not explic-
itly hold that such a requirement exists; it does so implicitly by holding,
[i]n the opinion of the court, under the plaintiff's claim both the
deposit transactions and the loan transactions would be purchases
or sales of securities .... As a result, plaintiffs have standing to
bring this action under section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act




even though the cause of the complaint in the two cases is the
same-i.e. loss through the inability to successfully complete the
tender offer-the outcome of each is different because of the
method of the fraud rather than its purpose and effect.
B. Derivative Actions
Another area where the Birnbaum purchase-seller require-
ment has been sidestepped is in cases where the plaintiff is suing
on behalf of a purchaser or seller of securities. This frequently
occurs where a shareholder of a corporation is suing deriva-
tively,10 5 a trustee in bankruptcy is suing for the bankrupt, 06 or
a statutory representative is suing on behalf of the defrauded
party.10 7  In such cases the plaintiff is merely standing in the
shoes of the defrauded party and receives no recovery in his own
right for the alleged violation.1 0 8  However, it must be remem-
bered that the entity in whose shoes the plaintiff is standing must
meet the requirements to sue under Rule 10b-5.
C. Repudiation of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement
The Birnbaum doctrine has been explicitly repudiated by the
Seventh Circuit Court in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration.10 9 In its place the court has offered an "investor" re-
quirement for determining who has standing under Rule 10b-5. In
Eason the plaintiffs were shareholders of a corporation which
purchased a car leasing business from the defendants in exchange
for stock. The plaintiffs also acted as guarantors for certain
liabilities assumed by the corporate buyer. The court, in denounc-
ing the Birnbaum rule, held that the question of whether the
plaintiff had a right to relief under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
revolved around three issues: standing in its technical sense, the
105. E.g., Shell v. Hensly, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Des-
ser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); City National Bank of Fort Smith, Arkan-
sas v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Dasho v. Sus-
quehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Caesar's Palace Securi-
ties Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
106. Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971); Hooper
v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. de-
nied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
107. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971).
108. See Shell v. Hensly, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Des-
ser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); City National Bank of Fort Smith, Arkan-
sas v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970).
109. CCH FED. SEc. L. REI'. 1 94,344 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973).
class intended to be protected by the rule, and policy considera-
tions.110 In Eason the plaintiffs successfully met all three. As to
the first issue, the court held that because the outcome of the case
will affect the plaintiff in the amount of $300,000 the plaintiff has a
sufficient' interest in the controversy to meet the standing re-
quirements for federal jurisdiction."' As to the second issue, the
court held that "investors" encompass the class of persons to be
protected by Rule 10b-5 and that the plaintiffs fall within this
class because they act as guarantors of certain obligations and
were therefore in the middle of the transaction to buy the leasing
business in exchange for the stock. 1 2  With respect to the third
issue, the court held that neither the argument that the Birnbaum
rule prevents a flood of federal litigation nor the argument that it
serves to preserve consistency throughout the federal judiciary are
sufficient to preclude the plaintiff from suing in this case.
1 8
To replace the Birnbaum rule, Judge Stevens, speaking for
the court, formulated a rule that extends protection to
persons who, in their capacity as investors, suffer signifi-
cant injury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection
with a securities transaction, even though their participa-
tion in the transaction did not involve either the purchase
or sale of securities.
1 4
This formula is broad as it grants standing to sue even to the
individual investor on the street who as a result of the fraud
of the defendant failed to purchase securities that subsequently
rose substantially." 5  However, the scope is significantly reduced
as Judge Stevens warns that the right to private relief under Rule
10b-5 is not unrestricted and should be limited to possibly a "tar-
get area" or a "direct injury" type of analysis as is used in deter-
mining standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act." 6 In the fi-
nal analysis, the court concedes that the effect of the formula
proposed in the case will differ slightly from the effect of the pur-
chaser-seller requirement as it is now used. 1 7 If this is the re-
sult, one wonders why the Birnbaum rule should be discarded.
110. Id. at 95,160.
111. Id. at 95,161. See C.A. WRIGHr, FEDERAL COURTS, § 13 (1970); Her-
pich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, in which the court held that,
the standing of a private plaintiff to sue for violation of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to be decided, of course, within the frame-
work of Article 11I of the United States Constituion which restricts
federal judicial power to 'cases' and 'controversies.'
Id. at 805.
112. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,344 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973).
113. Id. at 95,163 to 64.
114. Id. at 95,163.
115. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,191 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1973).
116. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,344 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973). See generally Comment, 77 DicK. L. REv.
73 (1972).
117. Id. at 95,164.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Under the investor formula of Eason new questions would
have to be answered that are not relevant under the purchaser-
seller requirement. Are unsuccessful tender offerors within the
"special class" to be protected by Rule 10b-5? Are shareholders of
a corporation who allege fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities by the corporation or by the owner of control
within the class protected by the rule? Not only are these ques-
tions irrelevant under a doctrine that looks for a purchase or sale
of securities, but under the Eason formula the answers would seem
to be inconsistent with existing case law which has traditionally
denied these "investors" standing under the Birnbaum rule.118 Al-
though the Eason court held that, insofar as the plaintiffs acted as
guarantors in the purchase of the car leasing business, they were
certainly investors, the court left open the issue of whether a
stockholder of a corporation that engages in a stock transaction is
an investor protected by Rule 10b-5.1 9 If such a stockholder is an
investor, then the investor analysis seems to be equivalent to the
causal connection analysis used by the court in Young v. Seaboard
Corp.120 and perhaps should be discarded in favor of the analysis
used in that case as the difficult and unanswered question of who
is an "investor" is avoided.
CONCLUSION
To determine who has a private right of action under Rule
10b-5, certain basic principles are generally recognized by the fed-
eral judiciary. All but one court has recognized that the plaintiff
suing for damages must be either a purchaser or seller of securi-
ties. However, the classes of people who have been deemed to be
purchasers and sellers for purposes of Rule lOb-5 are not simply
those that purchase or sell securities in the typical sense of those
words. As Judge Stevens has remarked, they include "issuers,
trust beneficiaries, merging corporations, minority shareholders in
short form mergers, parties to incomplete transactions, offerees,
and others. . "..",12' The purchaser-seller requirement has been
118. E.g., H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st
Cir. 1973); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Erling v.
Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970); Iroquois Ind., Inc. v. Syracuse China
Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
119. See Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., CCH FED. SE. L.
REP. [ 94,344 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973).
120. 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973). See notes 94-104 and accompany-
ing text supra.
121. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,344 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1973).
generally dispensed with, however, when one is seeking injunctive
relief. In such cases the plaintiff must allege a causal connection
between a securities transaction and the injury suffered.
Even though these are the basic rules, there are technical dis-
tinctions made by various circuits which result in conflict and con-
fusion. To say that the circuit courts are in agreement as to the
propriety and application of the purchaser-seller requirement
would be less than truthful. There is disagreement as to whether
a person suing under Rule 10b-5 must be a purchaser or seller of
securities. The circuits that adhere to the purchaser-seller re-
quirement are in disarray as to how flexibly the rule should be
applied; and furthermore, the conflict has caused courts and attor-
neys to deal with similar cases in conflicting ways.
The Seventh Circuit has discarded the requirement altogether,
replacing it with an "investor" requirement. 12 2 That circuit has
disavowed the Birnbaum rule claiming that it is merely an "ap-
pendage" to the holding in that case.123 The Ninth Circuit has
stretched the purchaser-seller requirement to its limits holding
that an offeree under a consent decree may sue for damages under
Rule l0b-5.12 4 It based its decision on the aborted purchaser line of
cases favorably ruled upon by the Ninth,125 Seventh, 1 26 and Sec-
ond 127 Circuits, but on an analysis not explicitly adopted by any
of them. A striking example of the discord among the circuits in-
volves the interpretation they have given to the Supreme Court's
decision in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co.1
28
The Third129 and First' 30 Circuits ruled that Bankers Life has not
eliminated the purchaser-seller requirement. The Tenth Circuit, on
the other hand, held that Bankers Life illustrates a trend towards
liberal construction of the Birnbaum rule, 3 ' and the District Court
in that Circuit has interpreted the Circuit Court's decision as dis-
carding the purchaser-seller requirement altogether.3 2 There is
also inconsistency among the circuits with respect to the meaning
of certain doctrines. The Third Circuit considers the "forced seller"
doctrine as a mere legal fiction applicable only to persons who
122. Id. at 95,162.
123. Id. at 95,164.
124. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,191 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1973).
125. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); Mount
Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
126. Goodman v. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
127. Opper v. Hancock Securities, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Com-
merce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
128. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
129. Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d
Cir. 1973).
130. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 425 (1st
Cir. 1973).
131. Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1973).
132. Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490, 494-95 (D. Utah 1973).
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still hold securities, but who, because of practical considerations,
will have to sell them.13 The Second Circuit, in contrast, has ap-
plied the "forced seller" concept where, at the time on the trial
the plaintiff has already sold securities."84 Inconsistency arises
also with respect to the lack of analytical precision respecting the
application of the purchaser-seller requirement. The Supreme
Court analyzed the merger situation in terms of the conduct of the
shareholder in approving or disapproving the merger without
questioning the validity of the analysis used by the circuits which
focused on the statutory definition of purchase and sale.13 5 As a
result of the conflict among the circuits, a definitive answer as to
who has a right to bring a private action under Section 10 (b) of
the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereun-
der is lacking. The Supreme Court should remedy this situation.
An abandonment of the purchaser-seller requirement in an ac-
tion for damages should not be the remedy, however. Rather,
it is submitted that a consistent and flexible application of the
Birnbaum rule is more desirable. Its effect would be to grant re-
lief to those whom Rule lOb-5 was meant to protect. Correlatively,
the continued application of the rule would provide a sifting de-
vice for precluding cases that should not be brought under Rule
lOb-5. As Circuit Judge Hand held in Birnbaum, Rule 10b-5 ex-
tends protection "only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.""'16 For
the past twenty-two years, since Birnbaum has been adjudicated,
courts have been expounding upon and clarifying the meaning of
the terms purchaser and seller under Rule lOb-5. The reason that
conflict exists among the circuits is that the extent of flexibility
has not been defined and the Supreme Court has failed to resolve
the issue explicitly. Is the Second Circuit's application of the
"forced seller" concept correct, or does the Third Circuit correctly
interpret the concept? 37 Is the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the stand-
ing requirement justified, or should the line be drawn short of al-
lowing identifiable offerees standing to sue under Rule lOb-5?"'8 A
definitive response to these questions would resolve the conflict
among the circuits and enhance the stability that has been gained
through twenty-two years of case law.
MICHAEL I. LEVIN
133. Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 159 (3d
Cir. 1973).
134. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (1969).
135. See notes 78-88 and accompanying text supra.
136. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (1952).
137. See notes 128-29 and accompanying text supra.
138. See notes 44-69 and accompanying text supTa.
ILLEGITIMACY IN PENNSYLVANIA
rINRODUCTION
Illegitimacy . . . continues to strike .a discordant and jar-
ring note in our society. It is regarded as the fruit of
a union of shame, irreverance and depravity. We have
not yet achieved that sophistication or charity which
would allow us to understand and deal with this problem
without passion. Indeed our wrath has most often been
visited not upon those who have violated our ethical and
moral codes, but rather upon the blameless child.'
rhe history of society's treatment of he illegitimate ch'd
2
is a history of maltreatment frequently punctuated by insensitivity
at best and more often an unrelenting vengeance. Society desig-
nated the illegitimate by the term bastard which soon became a
term of contempt; and a bastard was likened to a thief, beggar or
prostitute.3 Illegitimates have been referred to as an "unfortunate
class of men" and at common law the illegitimate child was a filius
nullius who could inherit nothing.4 Because the act creating the il-
legitimate child was viewed as immoral, the illegitimate was per-
ceived as immoral and inferior, and the legal liabilities imposed up-
on the illegitimate child were society's method of imposing vindic-
tive punishment. 5 The public policy of fostering marriage and legit-
imacy has been cited by the courts to attempt to justify the vindic-
tive treatment of the innocent child of the illicit affair,6 yet one
must question the deterrent effect of punishing the child rather
than the parent. Certainly in today's society the stigma attached
to being illegitimate should have decreased as enlightenment in-
creased; but the stigma fades slowly.
The origin of the distinction between legitimate and illegit-
imate children is perhaps not so remarkable, in view of
Christian doctrines of marriage, as is the tenacity with
which the distinction has persisted in our law and customs.
1. Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 400-01, 213 A.2d
155, 157 (1965).
2. See 1 J. REED, PENNSYLVAIA BLACKsToNE 238 (1831):
[An illegitimate child is defined to be a child] not only begotten,
but born out of lawful matrimony.
3. See Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Amw. J. Soc.
215 (1939).
4. See 1 J. REED, PENNSYLVANIA BLACKSTONE 242 (1831).
5. See Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. Soc.
215, 223 (1939).
6. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMzsTIc RELATIONS 162 (1968).
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At times it seems that the stigma which accompanies il-
legitimacy is greater today than in the Middle Ages.
7
Judicial recognition of the inherent unfairness of the legal lia-
bilities imposed upon the illegitimate child probably explains the
judicial policy of holding a child to be legitimate whenever possi-
ble.8 If the real reasons for the vindictive treatment of the illegiti-
mate are to foster marriage and legitimacy then certainly today the
punishment of the illegitimate child should be seen as ineffective
in achieving these goals, and society instead should impose its sanc-
tions upon the parents who engage in the illicit act. The fact that
no such change has occurred is fairly persuasive evidence that these
justifications offered for the sanctions imposed upon the illegitimate
are illusory and fictitious. The sanctions must instead be based up-
on some other and less noble reasoning. The most likely reasons
seem to be historical prejudice 9 and the desire to prevent dilution
of the putative father's0 present and future estate by preventing
the illegitimate child from inheriting from his father. The putative
father does have some legal liabilities but it is significant that the
liabilities primarily affect the father who acknowledges his pater-
nity and wants to be a parent to his illegitimate child rather than
the father who attempts to avoid responsibility."
This article will examine and analyze the rights, duties and
liabilities of the illegitimate child, the natural mother of the illegi-
timate child, and the putative father in Pennsylvania. The impor-
tance of this area of the law has greatly increased because the inci-
dence of illegitimate births in the United States has risen greatly
7. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoruasTic RELATIONS 155-56 (1968).
8. Fitzpatrick v. Miller, 129 Pa. Super. 324, 329, 196 A. 83, 86 (1938).
The presumption that the child of a married woman is legitimate is cov-
ered more fully in notes 114-116 and accompanying text infra.
9. See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv.
477, 493 (1967). See H. KRAusE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1971) for an excellent discussion of society's treatment of the illegitimate.
For a discussion of the treatment accorded illegitimates in other nations,
see Krause, Bastards Abroad-Foreign Approaches to Illegitimacy, 15 AM.
J. CoMP. 726 (1966-67).
10. State v. Nestaval, 72 Minn. 415, 75 N.W. 725 (1898). The court
defined a putative father to be the alleged or supposed father of an ille-
gitimate child.
11. The skeptical view which courts have toward putative fathers
who demonstrate a desire to assume parental duties is illustrated in notes
28 and 29 and accompanying text infra. Other articles dealing with the
rights, duties and liabilities of the putative father include Lasok, Legal
Status of the Putative Father, 17 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 634 (1968); Lippert,
Need For a Clarification of the Putative Father's Legal Rights, 8 J. FAM.
L. 398 (1968); Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Le-
gitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. L. 231
(1971).
in recent years.1 2 The possible effect of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment will not be dis-
cussed in great detail due to the exhaustive examination already
accorded these areas in other articles.'3
I. CUSTODY
A. Existing Pennsylvania Law
When a child is born to a mother who is not married to the
father, great problems can arise in the legal determination of who
shall receive custody of the child. The decisive factor which
guides the courts of this Commonwealth in child custody proceed-
ings is the "best interests of the child" test.1 4 In deciding in whose
custody the best interests of the child will be furthered most ef-
fectively, the court considers the child's physical, intellectual,
moral, spiritual and emotional well-being. 15 Interestingly the dis-
senting opinion in one Pennsylvania case argued that the best in-
terests of the child are best protected by awarding custody to a
third party based on the fact that the child's illegitimate origin will
remain a secret if the child lived with this third party.16 However,
the majority view states that the best interests of the child deter-
mination is a factual determination which will depend upon the
unique factual situation of each case. 17 Having formulated the
12. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS (1968):
The rate of illegitimate births in the United States per thousand
unmarried women between the ages of fifteen to forty-four has
trebled between 1940 and 1960.
Id. at 156.
What effect the more liberal abortion laws and the greater availability
of contraceptive devices will have upon the incidence of illigitimate births
is uncertain at the present time. For an excellent discussion of the causes
of the high incidence of illegitimate births, see Proposals For Change in
Pennsylvania's Treatment of the Illegitimate, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 566 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH.
L. REv. 477 (1967); Marcus, Equal Protection: Custody of the Illegitimate
Child, 11 J. FAM. L. 1 (1971); Schafrick, Emerging Constitutional Protec-
tion of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 7 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1973); Tab-
ler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints
on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. L. 231 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362
Pa. 85, 93, 66 A.2d 300, 305 (1949); In re Hawthorne, 146 Pa. Super. 20,
22, 21 A.2d 521, 523 (1941). In determining a custody dispute between
the parents of a child the courts are required by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§ 92 (1965) to base their decision upon the fitness of the parents and the
welfare of the child.
15. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448
Pa. 437, 444, 292 A.2d 380, 383 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v.
Shaw, 202 Pa. Super. 339, 340, 195 A.2d 878, 879 (1963); Commonwealth
ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse, 176 Pa. Super. 361, 364, 108 A.2d 73, 74 (1954).
16. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 263 Pa. 85,
100, 66 A.2d 300, 307 (1949) (dissenting opinion). If this factor of keeping
the child's illegitimate origin a secret is a consideration used by other
courts in custody proceedings the courts do not include it in their written'
opinions.
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. McKee v. Reitz, 193 Pa. Super.
125, 128, 163 A.2d 908, 911 (1960).
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"best interests of the child" rule the courts proceeded in the best
of judicial traditions to carve out of the rule certain exceptions.
These exceptions are stated in the form of assumptions that the
"best interests of the child" will be furthered by a judicial prefer-
ence for certain specific groups involved in custody proceedings
such as natural parents or mothers.' 8 In a custody proceeding be-
tween a natural parent and a third party, the natural parent has
a prima facie right to the custody of his or her child as against
the third party.'9 This judicial preference for the natural parent
seems to be a valid exception to the "best interests of the child"
rule since maintenance of the family unit as the basic social unit in
our society is an important state interest which the courts should
protect. The court in Commonwealth ex rel. Martino v. Blough
explains the validity of this judicial preference for the natural
parents:
[W] ithout detracting from the virtue of the principle [that
the welfare of the child is the prime concern in child cus-
tody disputes] we must warn that it is not without linita-
tion in its application. If this principle were universally
applied, any person who by religion, morals, education,
love, understanding and social and economic status was
"better" than the person who had custody of a child could
obtain custody of that child by a habeas corpus proceeding,
and the best person could obtain custody of any of our
children.
20
This right of the parents to the custody of their child is a
natural right 2' resulting from the parental duty to support the
child,22 but is not uncontrollable or inalienable.23 The parental
right to custody, based upon the assumption that the child's best
interests will normally be furthered by awarding custody to the
parents, can be forfeited through parental misconduct which sub-
stantially and adversely affects the child's welfare.
24
In a custody proceeding between the two parents the mother
has a prima facie right to the custody of her child.25 This mater-
18. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437,
444, 292 A.2d 380, 383 (1972) (natural parents); Commonwealth ex rel.
Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. 210, 215, 166 A.2d 60, 64 (1960) (mothers).
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437,
444, 292 A.2d 380, 383 (1972).
20. 201 Pa. Super. 346, 349, 191 A.2d 918, 919 (1961).
21. Commonwealth v. Wormser, 260 Pa. 44, 46, 103 A. 500, 501 (1918).
22. Nangle v. Yoho, 172 Pa. Super. 629, 633, 95 A.2d 341, 343 (1953).
23. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85,
95, 66 A.2d 300, 305 (1949) (not uncontrollable); Commonwealth v. Worm-
ser, 260 Pa. 44, 46, 103 A. 500, 501 (1918) (not inalienable).
24. Id.
25. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437,
nal right to custody of the child imposes upon the mother the duty
to support and maintain the child.2 6 This mother-child relationship
which the courts protect is not in the nature of a blood relationship
but is the relationship which develops as a result of the association
of the child and the mother during the child's early years.27  In
the case of the mother of an illegitimate child there is a more
practical reason for selecting her as the person to have custody, be-
cause:
[I]n almost all cases, the unwed mother is readily identi-
fiable, generally from hospital records, and alternatively
by physicians or others attending the child's birth. Unwed
fathers, as a class, are not traditionally quite so easy to
identify and locate. Many of them either deny all respon-
sibility or exhibit no interest in the child or its welfare;
and, of course, many unwed fathers are simply not aware
of their parenthood.
28
An additional reason for preferring the mother in custody disputes
is eXpr.qsed in the dissenting opinion in Stanley v. Illinois:
[A] state is fully justified in concluding on the basis of
common human experience that the biological role of the
mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger
bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting
from the male's often casual encounter .... Centuries of
human experience buttress this view of the realities of hu-
man conditions and suggest that unwed mothers of illegit-
imate children are generally more dependable protectors
of their children than are unwed fathers.2 9
If the child is of tender years"° the presumption that the inter-
ests of the child are normally best served by awarding custody to
the natural mother, applies even more strongly than when the
child is older.31 This presumption of even greater maternal need
is called the doctrine of tender years.
In order for the father to overcome the presumption in favor of
the mother in custody disputes the father must prove not only that
the mother is unfit to have custody but also that the award of cus-
444, 292 A.2d 380, 383 (1972) which holds that the mother's prima facie
right to custody of her child is one of the strongest presumptions in the
law. The mother of a child also has a prima facie right to its custody
above that of the paternal grandfather. Commonwealth v. Fee, 6 S. &
R. 255, 257 (Pa. 1820).
26. In re Hawthorne, 146 Pa. Super. 20, 21, 21 A.2d 521, 522 (1941).
27. Commonwealth ex reZ. Cleary v. Weaver, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 715,
717 (C.P. Clin.), aff'd, 188 Pa. Super. 197, 146 A.2d 374 (1959).
28. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
29. Id.
30. Commonwealth ex rel. Doberstein v. Doberstein, 201 Pa. Super.
102, 106, 192 A.2d 154, 156 (1963). A child is of tender years if it is young,
but rather than arbitrarily setting a maximum age limit the courts use
the child's intelligence and age development to determine if the child is
of tender years.
31. Commonwealth ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo, 222 Pa. Super. 591, 596,
296 A.2d 838, 840 (1972).
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tody of the child to him is in the best interests of the child.
82
The courts require little proof from the natural mother that she
is qualified to have custody of her child other than an expres-
sion of desire on her part to retain the child, because she is as-
sumed to be qualified unless the father can prove her unfit by dem-
onstrating "gross, inexcusable neglect, coupled with evidence of
unconcern and irresponsibility."8 Other courts in describing what
the father's evidence must prove, have stated that the presumption
for the mother can be overcome only in the most extreme of circum-
stances,8 4 by proof of abandonment by the mother, 5 or if compel-
ling reasons appear 6 The courts have never specifically stated
what will be considered a "compelling reason" because the unique
facts of each case must be determinative, 37 however, the courts
have made definitive statements that certain maternal traits or
conditions in the mother's home will not be deemed compelling and,
therefore, will not overcome the presumption in favor of the moth-
er.
38
The mother's past behavior can be introduced as evidence of
unfitness but the judicial determination of the mother's fitness or
unfitness will be made based on the court's perception of the
mother's present fitness as a parent.39 There have been a few
cases where the father or a third party has been able to prove the
mother unfit but the burden of proof imposed upon the party op-
32. Commonwealth ex tel. Kevitch v. McCue, 165 Pa. Super. 49, 51,
67 A.2d 582, 583 (1949). If the child is of tender years the father's burden
is even greater.
33. In re Adoption of Austin, 426 Pa. 441, 443, 233 A.2d 526, 527
(1967).
34. Commonwealth ex tel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437,
444, 292 A.2d 380, 383 (1972).
35. In re Hawthorne, 146 Pa. Super. 20, 22, 21 A.2d 521, 522 (1941).
The court found that the mother had forfeited all rights to custody of the
child by leaving the child with a third party, failing to support the child
and acting immorally.
36. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 219 Pa. Super.
402, 403-04, 281 A.2d 729, 730 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex tel. McKee v. Reitz, 193 Pa. Super.
125, 128, 163 A.2d 908, 911 (1960).
38. Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 355-56, 299
A.2d 243, 245 (1973) (interracial marriage); Commonwealth ex tel. Logue
v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. 210, 216-17, 166 A.2d 60, 62 (1960) (mother having
to work, father's higher standard of living); Commonwealth ex tel. Pres-
sens v. Seigler, 167 Pa. Super. 598, 602, 76 A.2d 454, 456 (1950) (meritri-
cious relationship between natural mother and putative father); Common-
wealth ex rel. Lewis v. Tracy, 155 Pa. Super. 257, 260, 38 A.2d 405, 406
(1944) (mother snatching child away from school); Commonwealth eX Tel.
Yeakley v. Boyer, 13 Pa. D. & C. 128 (C.P. Berks 1929) (mother's poor
circumstances).
39. Commonwealth ex tel. Ruczynski v. Powers, 206 Pa. Super. 415,
420, 212 A.2d 922, 925 (1965).
posing the mother is so formidable 40 that it can seldom be met.
However, at least one court held that the presumption for the
mother should not be extended further than circumstances require
and awarded custody of the children to the natural father rather
than to his divorced wife.41 The foster parents prevailed against
the mother in another case where the court held that the poor
condition of the child while ii the natural mother's care, the fact
that the natural mother had twice relinquished control, and her
past treatment of the child required a finding of unfitness on
the part of the mother.42  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
affirming this superior court decision, felt that the finding of




In Commonwealth ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo the court found
the mother to be unfit to have custody of her illegitimate children
and awarded custody to the putative father.44 The mother's moral
character, emotional instability, and her adverse effect upon the
children were contrasted by the court with the father's positive
influence upon the children. The Rainford case illustrates that
a father of illegitimate children can prevail over the mother in a
custody dispute, but in considering the evidence which a father
must present in order for a court to find the mother unfit, his
chances of gaining custody, if the mother chooses to contest his
claim for custody, seem very remote in Pennsylvania.
One factor which a court will consider in a custody proceeding
is a child's preference for a person other than the mother, but such
a preference will not be given much weight if the child is of ten-
der years. 45 Because there is no specific age when a child is held
40. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
41. Commonwealth ex rel. Buell v. Buell, 186 Pa. Super. 468, 471, 142
A.2d 338, 340 (1958).
42. Commonwealth ex rel. Ruczynski v. Powers, 206 Pa. Super. 415,
421, 212 A.2d 922, 924-25 (1965).
The dissenting opinion would have upheld the presumption that the
mother should receive custody despite the strong evidence that the child's
interests would be better served by awarding custody to the foster parents.
43. Commonwealth ex rel. Ruczynski v. Powers, 421 Pa. 2, 5, 219 A.2d
460, 461 (1966).
The factors which the court emphasized in finding the natural mother
unfit were that the child was in such an untidy, emaciated condition, was
untrained in hygiene and could only speak his own name while in the
mother's care. The court also considered the fact that the mother had
been employed in a house of lewd behavior.
44. 222 Pa. Super. 591, 597, 296 A.2d 838, 841 (1972).
The court cited the mother's unexplained trips to New York City to
earn money, the fact that the mother had gotten pregnant out of wedlock
a second time, the fact that the mother had not visited her children in
almost a year and the apparent psychological harm she had caused the
children as the reasons for the finding that the mother was unfit and
awarding custody of the child to the father.
45. Commonwealth ex rel. Doberstein v. Doberstein, 201 Pa. Super.
102, 106, 192 A.2d 154, 156 (1963).
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to be no longer of tender years the trial judge has great discretion
in determining how much weight to give to a child's preference. 46
In Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw the child of tender years
preferred her paternal grandparents because she had lived with
them for four years and two months, but the court still upheld the
presumption for the natural mother.47 If the child is no longer of
tender years then his preference will receive more weight since the
father is presumed to be needed more by a child not of tender
years.
48
Occasionally a court will award custody to a person other than
the mother without finding the mother unfit. In Commonwealth
ex rel. Mitchell v. Mitchell the court applied the "best interests of
the child" test and mentioned the presumption in favor of the moth-
er, but did not apply the presumption, awarding custody of the
child to the father based on the fact that the father's country home
was a better environment in which to live than was the mother's
city apartment.49 Never in this decision did the court declare the
mother to be unfit. In Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-
Moritz the environment of the mother's home was declared to be
such that the child's welfare would not be promoted and the court
awarded custody to a person other than the mother without finding
the mother to be unfit. 0 The Mitchell and Holschuh courts used
the "best interests of the child" test to determine who should receive
custody of the child without use of the presumption in favor of the
mother. These two cases have not been followed, however, and in
neither case was the child illegitimate. In one case, however, a
court awarded custody of an illegitimate child to the father rather
46. See note 30 supra which indicates the factors a trial judge should
use in determining if a child is of tender years.
47. 202 Pa. Super. 339, 344, 195 A.2d 878, 880 (1963).
48. Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. 210, 216,
166 A.2d 60, 64 (1960). The court held that where children were seven
and nine years old the doctrine of tender years applies regardless of the
children's preference but when the children were no longer of tender years
their preference becomes important.
This court mentions the possible use of the "economic benefit" test
if the tender years doctrine no longer applies. The determination of cus-
tody using this test is based upon the premise that the child's interests
normally will be served best by awarding custody to the parent who can
best supply the child's economic needs until emancipation. No other case
was found in which this test was used. It seems wise that this test is
not often used because the economically superior person is not necessarily
the better person to have custody of a child. Even after the tender years,
love and parental guidance are required more by a child than are money
and material goods.
49. 186 Pa. Super. 347, 352, 142 A.2d 304, 306 (1958).
50. 219 Pa. Super. 402, 404, 281 A.2d 729, 730 (1971).
than allowing the child to be adopted, which was what the mother
desired, without finding the mother unfit." This case, however, is
not a precedent for allowing a father to have custody instead of the
mother without a finding that the mother is unfit because the moth-
er in this case was not seeking custody for herself.
When the natural mother is dead the putative father of an
illegitimate child has a prima facie right to custody of the child
over all other persons.6 2 This is true even though the putative
father is not legally related to his illegitimate child.53 The puta-
tive father's right to custody is forfeited, however, if the court de-
cides the father is not suitable to have custody.54
As to legitimate children the general rule is that the
father, if suitable, is entitled to their custody, because of
his obligation to maintain and educate them. And his le-
gal right to custody, care, and companionship of his child,
though not absolute . . . will not be interfered with except
for the most substantial reasons affecting the child's wel-
fare. Essentially the same principles apply to the right
of a father to the custody of his illegitimate child.55
The father of a legitimate child has a prima facie right to cus-
tody as against all persons except the child's mother due to his ob-
ligation to support and educate the child.56 Although a puta-
tive father has no such legal duty unless forced upon him by a
support order of a court, the courts in custody proceedings will
give great weight to whether or not the putative father made sup-
port payments to his illegitimate child prior to the mother's death.
7
The criterion of "suitability," applied to the father, is similar to the
criterion of fitness which the courts apply to the mother to deter-
mine if she should retain or receive custody of her child. The
courts feel the natural relationship between the putative father
and the illegitimate child is important and should only be disturbed
if substantial factors adversely affecting the welfare of the child
51. In re Ziegler's Adoption, 59 Lanc. Rev. 239 (Pa. C.P. 1964). The
court allowed the father to intervene in the adoption proceeding and
awarded custody to him, despite the mother's desire that the child be
adopted. The court emphasized how well qualified the father was to re-
ceive custody.
52. Appeal of Pote, 106 Pa. 574, 581 (1884); Commonwealth ex rel.
Human v. Hyman, 164 Pa. Super. 64, 66, 63 A.2d 447, 448 (1949); Harper
v. Fuller, 142 Pa. Super. 98, 99, 15 A.2d 518, 519 (1940).
53. Commonwealth ex rel. Kevitch v. McCue, 165 Pa. Super. 49, 51,
67 A.2d 582, 583 (1949). The father is not related to his illegitimate child
for the purposes of descent either. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp.
1972).
54. Harper v. Fuller, 142 Pa. Super. 98, 99, 15 A.2d 518, 519 (1940).
55. Commonwealth ex rel. Human v. Hyman, 164 Pa. Super. 64, 65-
66, 63 A.2d 447, 448 (1949).
56. Commonwealth ex rel. Rockey v. Hoffman, 91 Pa. Super. 213, 214
(1927).
57. Harper v. Fuller, 142 Pa. Super. 98, 100, 15 A.2d 518, 519 (1940);





Although the courts give preference to natural parents in any
custody proceeding, the parent's relationship with his child is a
status, not a property right.59 This status is protected by the
courts if possible, but the courts, as the representatives of the
Commonwealth, have a primary duty to protect the best welfare
of the child.
An infant is the ward of the state and the latter may take
custody of the child away from even its own parents when
the welfare of the child so demands. When a child is
treated cruelly or is exposed to immoral or debasing condi-
tions or is being neglected to its detriment, it is the right
and duty of the state, acting through its courts, to transfer
the child's custody to persons who will treat the child in
such a manner as to foster its well being and promote its
health and happiness.a0
The interest of the Commonwealth in the child's welfare does not
terminate when custody is awarded to one of the parties, because
a custody order is always temporary and the order may be with-
drawn and custody awarded to another, if the child's best interests
will be furthered by such a change.8 1
The questions of support and custody are always separate and
distinct 62 and the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
cannot be used to determine custody of a child.63 Private agree-
ments between parents or between a parent and a third person
are not binding on the courts and the courts will award custody in
the same manner as if there was no such agreement.
6 4
58. Commonwealth ex rel. Human v. Hyman, 164 Pa. Super. 64, 67,
63 A.2d 447, 448 (1949).
59. Commonwealth ex tel. McKee v. Reitz, 193 Pa. Super. 125, 128,
163 A.2d 908, 910 (1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Voltz v. Voltz, 168 Pa.
Super. 51, 76 A.2d 464 (1950); In re Hawthorne, 146 Pa. Super. 20, 22,
21 A.2d 521, 522 (1941); In re Rosenthal, 103 Pa. Super. 27, 32, 157 A.
342, 344 (1931).
60. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85,
92, 66 A.2d 300, 304 (1949); In re Hawthorne, 146 Pa. Super. 20, 22, 21
A.2d 521, 523 (1941).
61. Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa. Super. 95, 99,
198 A.2d 377, 379 (1964).
62. Commonwealth v. Mexal, 201 Pa. Super. 457, 461, 193 A.2d 680,
682 (1963).
63. Commonwealth ex rel. Posnanskey v. Posnanskey, 210 Pa. Super.
280, 283, 232 A.2d 73, 75 (1967). See note 57 and accompanying text supra
for the effect of a father's support on the court's determination of custody.
Pennsylvania has adopted the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 2043-1 to 42 (Supp. 1973).
64. Commonwealth ex rel. Rosenberg v. Passan, 45 Luz. L. Reg. 171,
172 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
A person desiring custody of a child presently in the custody
of another can institute a habeas corpus proceeding in which the
courts determine which party shall get custody based on the child's
welfare, not on the rights of the parties.65 An appeal from the
lower court decision in a habeas corpus proceeding involving cus-
tody of a child receives the broadest possible scope of review not-
withstanding recent statutory changes. 6 However, even though
the scope of review is broad, the lower court's decision is given
great weight and will be reversed only if there has been a gross
abuse of discretion.
67
B. Analysis and Possible Alternatives
It is submitted that the "best interests of the child" rule is a
valid test to use in custody cases involving illegitimate children.
The judicial presumption, that awarding custody to the natural
parent or parents will be in the best interests of the child, unless
U e parent is .... ft nr un,iitalp can also be iustified as a valid
method to promote the state's interest in maintaining the integrity
of the family unit. However, in applying this assumption, the
courts should hold the natural parents to a higher standard of con-
duct since passing the present judicial tests of fitness and suitabil-
ity requires little more than an assertion by the natural parent
that he or she desires the custody of the child.68 The policy of pro-
moting the integrity of the natural family unit should be balanced
against the state's interest in having children in the custody of
qualified persons. By holding the natural parents to a higher
standard than is now required, the courts of the Commonwealth
could better carry out their duty of ensuring that the person
awarded custody is qualified to assume parental duties and prop-
erly guide and develop the child.
The presumption that the mother has a prima facie right to
custody as against all the world including the putative father,
is more difficult to justify because the custody dispute is not be-
65. Commonwealth ex rel. Horisk v. Horisk, 90 Pa. Super. 400, 403
(1927); Commonwealth ex rel. Herman v. Herman, 10 Lebanon 159, 160
(Pa. C.P. 1964).
66. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437,
443, 293 A.2d 380, 383 (1972). Despite PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1907
(Supp. 1973), appeals from habeas corpus decisions involving custody of
a child will continue to be granted the broadest possible scope of review.
67. Commonwealth ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo, 222 Pa. Super. 591, 598,
296 A.2d 838, 841 (1972). The lower court's ruling is given great weight
because the parties' attitudes and sincerity are so important in determining
the fitness and suitability of persons requesting custody of a child and
the lower court is in the best position to evaluate these factors.
68. Commonwealth ex rel. Ruczynski v. Powers, 206 Pa. Super. 415,
212 A.2d 922 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw, 202 Pa. Super.
339, 195 A.2d 878 (1963). These cases illustrate how little a parent has




tween a parent and a third person trying to take the child away
from his natural family unit but is between two natural par-
ents. The justification that the presumption for the mother ex-
pedites custody proceedings is a questionable justification in light
of the following statements in Stanley v. Illinois:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier
than individualized determination. But when, as here, the
procedure forecloses the determinative issues of compe-
tence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities
in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running
roughshod over the important interests of both parent and
child.6 9
"The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve le-
gitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance
in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency. '70 The constitutional
question of equal protection will be discussed later in this article
in reference to whether the mother's prima facie right to custody
violates the father's right to equal protection guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. In prior periods the presumption for the
mother was probably a valid judicial method of protecting the wel-
fare of the child. Today, with more women working away from
home and with the difference in the roles of men and women not as
distinct as in the past, perhaps the time has come for a close judicial
examination of the validity and utility of this presumption. A New
York court in Godinez v. Russo7 1 ruled that in custody proceedings
between the parents of a child there should be no prima facie right
to custody in either parent but the custody determination should be
based solely on the "best interests of the child." Perhaps after a
thorough examination of the basis for the presumption the courts
or legislature of Pennsylvania will agree with the Godinez court
69. 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
70. Id. at 656; accord, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
71. 49 Misc. 2d 66, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Westchester County Ct. 1966).
The ruling in Godinez was rejected in Roe v. Doe, 58 Misc. 2d 757, 296
N.Y.S.2d 685 (New York County Ct. 1968). The Pennsylvania Legislature
could enact a law stating that there shall be no prima facie right to cus-
tody in either parent of a legitimate or illegitimate child. N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAw § 70 (McKinney 1964) states that,
[i]n all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody
of the [legitimate or illegitimate] child in either parent, but the
courts shall determine solely what is for the best interest of the
child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness and
make award accordingly.
The addition of the words "legitimate and illegitimate" in any Pennsyl-
vania legislation will require the courts to eliminate the presumption in
all custody proceedings.
and eliminate from the law of Pennsylvania the presumption for
the mother.
II. SUPPORT
A. Existing Pennsylvania Law
In Pennsylvania the father of an illegitimate child has no com-
mon law duty to support his illegitimate child 72 nor do the paternal
grandparents of an illegitimate child have any duty to support
the child.7 3 However, the maternal grandparents do have a duty
to support their daughter's illegitimate child.74 Support statutes
have the purpose of requiring the father to support his illegiti-
mate child to further the welfare of the child 75 and to prevent the
illegitimate child from becoming a public charge. 78 At one time
the Pennsylvania statutes concerning fornication,77 bastardy7s and
child support by the father of an illegitimate child held that the
father could not only be held liable for maintenance of the child 79
but also could be fined 10 pounds or given 21 lashes. 80  Today
Pennsylvania has no fornication or bastardy criminal statutes8' but
72. Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 40, 42 (Q.S. Del.
1958). The court held that a father was only liable for support of his
illegitimate child if liability is established under a support statute in a
court.
The majority of the states hold that the father of an illegitimate has
no common law duty to support his illegitimate child. E.g., Montcrief v.
Eby, 19 Wend. 405 (N.Y. 1838). However, Kansas holds that the father
of an illegitimate does have a duty of support. Doughty v. Engler, 112
Kan. 583, 586, 211 P. 619, 621 (1923).
For an article discussing the issue of support for illegitimate children
from their father, see 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 146 (1969).
The duty of the father of a legitimate child to support his child has
been held to be "well nigh absolute." Firestone v. Firestone, 158 Pa.
Super. 579, 581, 45 A.2d 923, 924 (1946).
73. Commonwealth v. Campagna, 40 Pa. D & C. 478, 479 (C.C. Alleg.
1940).
74. In re McAllister, 31 Pa. D. & C. 4 (Q.S. Lanc. 1937).
75. Commonwealth v. Bertram, 143 Pa. Super. 1, 3, 16 A.2d 758, 759
(1940).
76. Commonwealth v. Campagna, 40 Pa. D. & C. 478, 483 (C.C. Alleg.
1940).
77. Fornication has been defined as unlawful carnal knowledge of a
man with a woman. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 110 Pa. Super. 279, 283,
168 A. 528, 530 (1933).
78. Bastardy has been defined as unlawful carnal knowledge of a man
with a woman resulting in the birth of a baby. Commonwealth v. Stewart,
110 Pa. Super. 279, 283, 168 A. 528, 530 (1933).
79. Act of January 12, 1705-6, 2 Statutes at Large 180, § VII [1705-6]
(repealed 1860).
80. Act of January 12, 1705-6, 2 Statutes at Large 180, § III [1705-6]
(repealed 1860).
81. Pennsylvania's fornication and bastardy statute, Act of Sept. 28,
1951, P.L. 1543, § 1 [1951] (repealed 1972) was not replaced in the new
Pennsylvania Crimes Code.
For insight into how the problems of bastardy and support were ap-
proached in the past, see Heliholz, Bastardy Litigation in Medieval Eng-
land, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 360 (1969) and for a discussion of the expand-
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does have a statute making a father's failure to support his illegiti-
mate child a misdemeanor of the third degree:
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree
if he, being a parent neglects or refuses to contribute rea-
sonably to the support and maintenance of a child born
out of lawful wedlock, whether within or without this
Commonwealth.8 2
A prosecution of the father for failure to support his illegiti-
mate child may be instituted by "every person capable of taking
an oath in a court of justice," because the offense is a misde-
meanor.8 3 The reason that failure to support was designated a mis-
demeanor with criminal penalties was to make support payments
appear to be the wiser course for the father to follow, because
the legislature recognized the inherent difficulty in enforcement
of support orders.8 4 If a father was convicted under the old forni-
cation and bastardy law 5 and the support order has now lapsed,
prosecution under the new statute for failure to support is not pre-
cluded even if the father complied fully with the previous support
order.8 6 If the father is convicted of failure to support his illegiti-
mate child the court may either fine the father or direct the father
to make support payments for the child's benefit to such person
as the court may designate.8 7 The amount of such payments de-
pends on the circumstances of the case with emphasis upon the
child's needs and the father's financial capacity.8 8 The statute of
limitations for prosecutions for failure to support is two years from
the birth of the child unless within those two years the father
ing rights of illegitimates in bastardy proceedings, see 34 Omo S. L.J. 428
(1973).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323 (Supp. 1973). In this statute the
phrase "child born out of lawful wedlock" means a child born when his
father and mother were not lawfully married to each other regardless of
whether the mother was married to some other man when the child was
born. Commonwealth v. Shavinsky, 174 Pa. Super. 273, 275, 101 A.2d 178,
179 (1954).
83. Commonwealth v. Abell, 75 Pa. Super. 267, 268-69 (1920).
84. The fact that the failure to support statute is criminal rather than
civil has in some cases made it more difficult to get support payments
from a father who denies his paternity. This will be illustrated in the
discussion in notes 101-113 and accompanying text infra.
85. Act of Sept. 28, 1951, P.L. 1543, § 1 [1951] (repealed 1972).
86. Commonwealth v. Pewatts, 200 Pa. Super. 22, 27, 186 A.2d 408,
410 (1963); Commonwealth v. Susanek, 88 Pa. Super. 428, 431 (1926).
87. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 18, § 4323(c) (Supp. 1973). Such payments
can be made retroactive to the date the information was brought. Com-
monwealth v. Shavinsky, 180 Pa. Super. 522, 529, 119 A.2d 819, 822 (1956).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323(c) (Supp. 1973). For procedures
and grounds for release of the father from custody for failure to pay sup-
port payments, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (1972).
voluntarily contributed to the support of the child or acknowledged
paternity in writing in which case the prosecution may be brought
at any time within two years from the time of such acknowledg-
ment or payment of such support.89 Extradition can be used in
criminal cases involving failure to support an illegitimate.90
In order for a man to be convicted of failure to support an il-
legitimate child his paternity must be admitted or proved.9 1 Con-
versely, if the mother is married, non-access to her husband must be
proved in order to rebut the strong judicial presumption of legit-
imacy.
92
Child support includes the mother's "lying in" expenses 93 and
the child's physical and educational needs.9 4 The father's duty of
support, however, does not include support for the mother.9 5 At-
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323(b) (Supp. 1973).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 191.1-.31 (1964). The Uniform Recipro-
cal Enforcement of Support Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 2043-1 to 42
(Supp. 1971), can also be used as a method of enforcement of support
orders.
91. Commonwealth v. Wibner, 73 Pa. Super. 349, 351 (1920).
92. Commonwealth v. Becker, 168 Pa. Super. 69, 70, 76 A.2d 657, 658
(1950); Commonwealth v. Barone, 164 Pa. Super. 73, 75, 63 A.2d 132, 134
(1949); Commonwealth v. Kerr, 150 Pa. Super. 598, 603, 29 A.2d 340, 343
(1943).
Discussion of the evidence required to prove paternity, the possible
defenses of the alleged father and the procedure involved in the criminal
proceedings for failure to support is beyond the scope of this article. For
discussion of these areas, see Harris, Some Observations on the Un-Uni-
form Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 9 VIL. L. REV. 59 (1965);
29 U. PrrT. L. REV. 559 (1968); 68 DICK. L. REv. 90 (1963).
The foreign approach to the common defense of an alleged father, ex-
ceptio plurium concubentium (this defense alleges that more than one man
had intercourse with the mother during the possible conception period),
is to hold all possible fathers liable for support. Note, Liability of Pos-
sible Fathers: A Support Remedy for Illegitimate Children, 18 STAN. L.
REv. 859 (1966). In Pennsylvania the possibility of prosecution for forni-
cation was a deterrent to a witness for the father testifying that he also
had intercourse during the possible conception period. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Harbaugh, 201 Pa. Super. 360, 365, 191 A.2d 844, 847 (1963).
However, this deterrent is nonexistent today because the fornication stat-
ute, Act of Sept. 28, 1951, P.L. 1543, § 1 [1951] (repealed 1972), was not
replaced with a new statute in 1972.
The alleged father in In re Gross, 17 Pa. D. & C. 766 (Q.S. Cent. 1931)
defended on the ground that even if he were the father he should not
have to pay support because he was forced to pay a large amount of
money to cure the venereal disease he had contracted from the mother.
This unique defense, needless to say, was rejected by the court. Id. at
767.
93. Commonwealth v. Tritt, 4 Chest. 418, 420 (Pa. C.P. 1950). The
lying in expenses include prenatal expenses and expenses of the birth of
the child.
94. Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. 303, 308 (1929).
Support may include college expenses if the child is able and willing
to pursue a college education and the cost is not an undue hardship on
the father. Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Gommerville, 200 Pa. Super.
640, 643, 190 A.2d 182, 184 (1963). For a discussion of college expenses
as an element of support, see 67 DICK. L. REv. 200 (1963).




tempts by illegitimates to collect damages from their father in
a cause of action for "wrongful life" have been unsuccessful. 9 An
agreement between the father and mother that the father will sup-
port the illegitimate child is enforceable as a valid contract9 7 and
such an agreement is in accordance with the judicial policy of en-
couraging settlement.9 8 However, agreements between parents
that the father will not be liable for the support of the illegitimate
child are not enforceable contracts because they are against pub-
lic policy 99
Pennsylvania law also permits a civil proceeding to be insti-
tuted against the alleged father to require support payments for the
illegitimate child. 100 However, the practical effect of these statutes
is largely restricted by the decision of the court in Commonwealth
v. Dillworth'01 1 which held that if the alleged father denies pa-
ternity at the civil trial, the issue of paternity must be determined
in a criminal proceeding in order to protect the alleged father's
guarantee to a jury trial.10 2 The lower court in Dillworth reasoned
that the civil court should be permitted to make a determination
of the issue of paternity when the alleged father denies paternity
in order to carry out what the lower court believed to be the legis-
lative intent in enacting the statute.10 3 This reasoning that the
legislature had manifested an intent to eliminate the father's
right to a jury trial was rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme
96. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963). For
a discussion of "wrongful life" as a tort, see 112 U. PA. L. REV. 780 (1964);
2 DUQUESNE L. REV. 125 (1963).
97. Rohrheimer v. Winters, 126 Pa. 253, 257, 17 A. 606, 607 (1889)
(such a support agreement is a valid contract and is not against public
policy); Jordan's Estate, 64 Dauph. 14, 15 (Pa. O.C. 1953) (oral contract
valid); Kaliszewski v. Weiss, 30 Erie 50, 51 (Pa. C.P. 1947). A subsequent
support order by a court does not invalidate an agreement between the
mother and father that the father will support the child.
For a discussion of support agreements between the mother and nat-
ural father, see 1970 L. & Soc. OmmEa 641 (1970).
98. Rohrheimer v. Winters, 126 Pa. 253, 257, 17 A. 606, 607 (1889);
Commonwealth v. Luciano, 205 Pa. Super. 397, 399, 208 A.2d 881, 883
(1965).
99. Commonwealth ex tel. Contino v. Contino, 72 Pa. D. & C. 550,
552 (M.C. Phila. 1949).
100. PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 62, §§ 2043-.31 to .40 (1968).
101. 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859 (1968).
102. PA. CoNsr. art. I, § 9.
103. Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Dillworth, 204 Pa. Super. 420, 423,
205 A.2d 111, 113 (1964). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not agree
that the purpose of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 2043.31-.40 (1968) would
be nullified by requiring paternity to be proved in a criminal proceeding
because a civil proceeding would be effective if the man admits paternity
but refuses to pay support. Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 484,
246 A.2d 859, 862 (1968).
Court. Justice Roberts, in his concurring opinion in Dillworth, ex-
pressed the view that the court's decision did not prohibit the legis-
lature from passing an act stating that there is no right to a jury
determination of the issue of paternity10 4 and that if the legislature
manifests such a clear intent then the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
could possibly hold this act to be valid.10 5
B. Analysis of Dillworth
The legislative purpose of the statutes1 06 allowing a civil suit
to be brought to obtain support payments for illegitimates seem-
ingly was to establish a more efficient civil process for obtaining
support.107 However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court felt the stat-
utes did not clearly manifest such an intent and restricted the sit-
uation in which the civil proceedings can be utilized. 0 8 Since the
Diflworth case no legislative action to clarify the intent of the sup-
port statutes allowing civil suit has occurred. The combined ef-
fect of the Dillworth decision and legislative inaction has been to
give to the irresponsibile father of the illegitimate an excellent
method by which to, delay and sometimes avoid entirely his respon-
sibility to support his illegitimate child.10 9 The alleged father who
actually is not the father of the illegitimate child receives little if
any practical benefit from the Dillworth decision that a jury trial
is required to determine the paternity issue. 10
A 1971 decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court"' diluted
104. 431 Pa. 479, 486, 246 A.2d 859, 863 (1968).
105. Id. at 491, 246 A.2d at 864.
106. PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 62, §§ 2043.31-.40 (1968).
107. As Justice Musmanno pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859 (1968) the legisla-
ture recognized that there was a large backlog of cases pending under the
criminal support statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323 (Supp. 1973) (for-
merly Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 732 [1939] (repealed 1972)), and
enacted PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 2043.31-.40 (1968) in order to relieve this
backlog and allow the illegitimate child to get support payments while
he is still a child.
108. Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 484-85, 246 A.2d 859, 862
(1968).
109. Id. at 504, 246 A.2d at 872 (dissenting opinion). Justice Mus-
manno recognized that the majority's holding in this case would result in
this undersirable effect.
This dissenting opinion contains an excellent synopsis and history of
the law of support in Pennsylvania and is an excellent source for anyone
interested in obtaining a general overview of how the support law of Penn-
sylvania developed.
110. The argument that the alleged father who is not actually the nat-
ural father of the child will fare better with a jury determination of his
paternity than with a judge's determination of paternity is not substan-
tiated by a survey published by the County Court of Philadelphia in 1962
concerning paternity determinations in Philadelphia. It was found in this
survey that the paternity issue is more frequently decided against the
father by a jury (92%) than by a judge (74%). Commonwealth ex rel.
Miller v. Dillworth, 204 Pa. Super. 420, 427-28, 205 A.2d 111, 115 (1964).
111. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 220 Pa. Super. 31, 36, 279 A.2d 251, 253
(1971). Thus an alleged father who wishes to contest his paternity but
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the Dillworth decision somewhat by holding that a jury trial to
decide paternity is only required if the alleged father demands
a jury trial, and if he does not then the right is waived. The Penn-
sylvania Legislature could act to make the entire procedure for
gaining support for an illegitimate child, including determination
of the issue of paternity, a civil procedure.
"[C] omprehensive statutes establishing civil suits for the determi-
nation of paternity [should be enacted]. Nothing whatever is to be
gained by the retention of the criminal forms, since enforcement
of the support order by contempt achieves the same purpose.
' '112
Once paternity has been established and a support order issued the
mother of the illegitimate child can sue in assumpsit for past due
payments."13
III. LEGITIMATION
A. Existing Pennsylvania Law
Sirrah, your brother is legitimate;
Your father's wife did, after wedlock, bear him:
And, if she did play fplse, the fault was hers .... 114
Just as there was in Shakespeare's England, there is today in
Pennsylvania a strong presumption that a child born to a married
woman is legitimate.115 This presumption of legitimacy may only
be overcome by clear, direct, satisfactory and irrefragable proof
to the contrary. 116
does not wish to risk the onus of a criminal conviction can waive his right
to a jury trial and have the paternity issue resolved in a civil proceeding.
112. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 165 (1968). Examples of
state statutes which have made paternity a civil issue include: CAL. Crv.
CODE § 196(a) (West 1954); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-111 (1954).
For a discussion of the difficulty in classifying bastardy proceedings
as civil or criminal, see Wysong, The Jurisprudence of Labels-Bastardy
as a Case in Point, 39 Ns. L. REV. 648 (1960).
For a discussion of possible revisions in existing state methods of han-
dling bastardy problems, see 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 177 (1970).
113. Commonwealth v. Showalter, 31 Pa. D. & C. 588 (C.P. Lanc.
1938).
114. Shakespeare, The Life and Death of King John, in SHAKESPEARE,
THE COMPLETE WonKs 548 (G.B. Harrison ed. 1952).
115. For a discussion of this presumption, see 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 129
(1970).
116. Rosenberger's Estate, 362 Pa. 153, 161, 65 A.2d 377, 380 (1949);
In re Thorn's Estate, 353 Pa. 603, 606, 46 A.2d 258, 260 (1946); Hamilton's
Estate, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 293, 296 (O.C. Phila. 1956). In Hamilton's Estate
the mother was twenty-eight years old and her husband was eighty-two
years old and the mother had been having an illicit affair with a younger
man. However, in the absence of direct proof of non-access to her elderly
husband the presumption of legitimacy was utilized by the court and the
Pennsylvania allows an illegitimate child to be legitimated by
a marriage of the child's parents and cohabitation by the parents
subsequent to this valid marriage.1 17  Once legitimated the child
possesses all the legal rights and duties of any other legitimate
child."18 Although the cohabitation requirement in the legitima-
tion statute is mandatory, not merely directory,119 the word "co-
habit" has been given a liberal construction because legitimation
of children is viewed with favor by the courts. 20 A common law
marriage in another state is sufficient to legitimate the child in
Pennsylvania. 121 If the marriage between the parents of a child is
subsequently declared void the child will nevertheless be held to
be the legitimate child of both parents.
122
The law of the father's domicile, not the child's domicile, is the
applicable law to use in determining the effect of any attempt by
a father to legitimate his illegitimate child. 123 Therefore, attempts
by a putative father whose domicile is Pennsylvania to legitimate
his illegitimate child by acknowledgement are ineffective 2 4 be-
cause legitimation can only be accomplished by marriage and co-
habitation. 25 However, an illegitimate child domiciled in Pennsyl-
vania may 'be legitimated through acknowledgment by its father if
acknowledgement is sufficient for legitimation in the father's domi-
cile.
child was held to be the legitimate child of its mother and her eighty-
two year old husband.
117. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 48, § 167 (Supp. 1973).
118. Id.
119. Sollinger's Estate, 40 Pa. Super. 3, 4 (1909). The Pennsylvania
Legislature retained the cohabitation requirement in the recent legitimation
statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 167 (Supp. 1973), and thereby demon-
strated that the purpose of the legitimation procedure in Pennsylvania is
not only to legitimate the child but to establish a family unit composed
of the natural mother, the natural father and the child. This legislative
intent is explained in Sollinger's Estate, supra.
120. Commonwealth ex rel. Dittman v. Dittman, 174 Pa. Super. 599,
601, 101 A.2d 145, 146 (1954) (one night of cohabitation is sufficient); In
Te Agnew's Estate, 11 Pa. County Ct. 137 (O.C. Phil. 1892) (a few days
of cohabitation is sufficient).
121. McCausland's Estate, 213 Pa. 189, 193, 62 A. 780, 781 (1906).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169.1 (1965).
123. In re Thorn's Estate, 353 Pa. 603, 611, 46 A.2d 258, 262 (1946);
Scallabrelli's Estate, 59 Pa. D. & C. 434, 435 (O.C. Dauph. 1947). H. Clark
feels:
[A] better solution would be to hold that if legitimation occurred
either by the law of the parent's domicile, or by the law of the
child's domicile, or by the law of the parent's domicile at his death
the child's status is that of a legitimate child in all states.
H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS 161 (1968).
124. A statement in the will of a putative father calling an illegitimate
child "my son" is not sufficient to legitimate the child. Wharton's Estate,
218 Pa. 296, 297-98, 67 A. 414, 415 (1907).
An acknowledgment of an illegitimate child by a father is insufficient
for the purpose of legitimating a child. Scallabrelli's Estate, 59 Pa. D.
& C. 434, 436 (O.C. Dauph. 1947).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169.1 (1965).
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A husband or a wife who is found guilty of the crime of adul-
tery may not marry the paramour during the lifetime of the spouse
of the wife or husband, but any child born to the wife will never-
theless be held to be the legitimate child of the wife and her hus-
band.12 6 If, however, the husband can prove non-access 127 then
the child will be held to be illegitimate. Thus if the crime of adul-
tery is proved against the wife and her husband can prove non-ac-
cess then the child born to the wife cannot be legitimated under
Pennsylvania law because the wife and natural father are forbid-
den from marriage 2 " and acknowledgment is insufficient. How-
ever, if no charges of adultery are proved then the wife and puta-
tive father may marry if the wife obtains a divorce and their mar-
riage and cohabitation will legitimate the child.12D If the husband
cannot prove non-access the presumption of legitimacy applies and
the child is deemed to be the legitimate child of the mother and
her husband.
For purposes of inheritance from the father, a marriage be-
tween the putative father and natural mother is sufficient to legi-
timate the child and no cohabitation is required in order for the
child to inherit from the father as a legitimate child.130
B. Alternatives
Ohio has adopted an alternative method of legitimation' 3 1
which seems to have several advantages. This statutory scheme
allows a child to be legitimated by his father if three requirements
are met:
1. The father files a written acknowledgment;
2. The court approves the acknowledgment using as the cri-
terion the best interests of the child;
3. The natural mother consents to the child's legitimation.
This statutory scheme allows the father to legitimate the child
without requiring a marriage between two persons who are pos-
sibly not compatible. Oregon eliminates the problems of legitima-
tion by holding all children to be the legitimate children of their
natural parents.'3 2 Under this statute the parent-child relation-
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Supp. 1973).
127. See 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 559 (1968) for a discussion of non-access in
Pennsylvania.
128. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
129. Commonwealth ex rel. Meta v .Cinello, 217 Pa. Super. 94, 268 A.2d
135 (1970) illustrates such a factual situation.
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972).
131. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Baldwin 1971).
132. ORE. REV. StAT. § 109.060 (1971).
ship is independent of the relationship between the parents. This
type of statutory. approach seems to be an excellent solution be-
cause the parents are required to accept the responsibilities of par-
enthood and the child is not punished for an illicit act in which he
took no part. The Oregon statute does not eliminate the problems
of proving paternity but once paternity is established the child
born out of wedlock becomes the legitimate child of its natural
father as well as its natural mother. It is submitted that either the
Ohio or Oregon type statute should be considered by the Pennsyl-
vania Legislature because it would impose legal sanctions upon the
correct person, the father, and could help to eliminate the
stigma 133 with which an illegitimate child must live.
Another alternative is a California type legitimation stat-
ute.13 4 However, because this statutory scheme requires the
father who is married to accept the child into his own family,
135 it
is less effective in inducing the father to acknowledge his illegiti-
mate child than the Ohio type statute3 6 under which a child
could be legitimated while remaining in the custody of the mother.
A California decision allowed prenatal legitimation by the
father by reasoning that the primary interest of an illegitimate
child is to be legitimated.'3 7 If the natural mother intends to retain
custody of the child after birth this emphasis by the court seems
valid because the child through legitimation becomes the legiti-
mate child of his natural parents. However, if the mother intends
to allow the child to be adopted then legitimation by the father
becomes less important because through adoption the child will
probably be placed with good parents and the child's ties with his
natural parents will be severed. 138 Allowing prenatal legitimation
in this situation could impede the adoption procedure because
the father's consent is required in order for his legitimate child'39
to be adopted. To avoid such a situation the California courts re-
quire a mother's consent in order for the father to legitimate his
child.140  The United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
133. See notes 5-10 and accompanying text supra.
134. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 230 (West 1954) permits legitimation by the pu-
tative father if he meets three requirements: public acknowledgment of
paternity, treating the child as if it were legitimate and accepting the child
into his family with the consent of his wife if he is married. There is
an excellent discussion of this statute in Marcus, Equal Protection: Cus-
tody of the Illegitimate Child, 11 J. FAM. L. 1, 34-37 (1971).
135. Bryant v. Ellis, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
136. OHao REv. CoDx AN. § 2105.18 (Baldwin 1971).
137. Lavell v. Adoption Institute, 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr.
367 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
138. See notes 209-212 and accompanying text infra.
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411(3) (Supp. 1973).
140. Lavell v. Adoption Institute, 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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Wade141 could cast serious doubt on the validity of any pre-natal
legitimation prior to the third trimester.
C. Artificial Insemination
The relatively recent development of artificial insemination
142
as a method of inducing a pregnancy can cause novel questions
concerning legitimacy and illegitimacy. Artificial insemination
with the semen of a third party donor, A.I.D., 43 has presented the
courts with the difficult question of whether a child born as a result
of A.I.D. is legitimate or illegitimate. A New York court in 1963
held that a child conceived by A.I.D., even though performed with
the husband's consent, was illegitimate.144 However, because the
A.I.D. method of impregnation was utilized by the mother with the
husband's consent the court, relying upon the theory of implied
contract, held the husband liable to support the child.1 45 In a recent
decision,146 another New York court held that a child conceived by
means of A.I.D. was the legitimate child of the mother and her
husband, if the husband's consent had been obtained prior to con-
ception. 47 Because this recent New York case 148 was not distin-
guishable in any significant manner from the 1963 New York
case149 New York seems to lean toward holding a child conceived by
means of A.I.D. with the husband's consent to be legitimate.
"The number of children conceived by A.I.D. is not known. It
is sufficiently large, however, to require statutory protection of the
children so conceived, because only by statute can their status be
clearly and incontestably established."'1 50 Pennsylvania presently
has no statute making children legitimate who are born as a result
of A.I.D. 1'
141. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a coverage of the effect of this decision
see notes 174 and 175 and accompanying text infra.
142. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 157-58 (1968) for a
discussion of artificial insemination.
143. Id. For a discussion of the effect of A.I.D. socially and legally
upon today's society, see Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artifi-
cial Insemination, 1965 WiscoNsIN L. REV. 849 (1965).
144. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct.
1963). This case is discussed in 30 BKLN. L. REv. 126 (1963).
145. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
146. In re Annonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Kings County Ct. 1973).
147. Id. at 435. The judicial policy of holding a child to be legitimate
if possible supports this result.
148. Id.
149. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
150. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONs 158 (1968).
151. A possible statute to use as a guideline in adopting a Pennsyl-
IV. VisITATioN RIGrs
In 1965 the Pennsylvania Superior Court granted visitation
rights to a putative father to allow visitation with his illegitimate
child. 152 This holding expressly overruled an earlier decision in
which the superior court had ruled that a putative father should
never be granted visitation rights with his illegitimate child.'5 3
Before examining the reasoning of these two cases, an examination
of Pennsylvania policy in reference to granting visitation rights to
the father of a legitimate child is advisable.
A parent of a legitimate child is seldom denied visitation
rights with his child and even failure of the father to support the
child is not a ground for denial of visitation rights.15 4 The basis
for seldom denying visitation rights to a natural parent is that the
child's welfare is usually furthered by free visitation by the parent
not having custody. 155 The natural parent will be denied visi-
tation with his child only if such visits will be detrimental to the
best interests of the chilu 15 6 because the courts -ee' estrangement
of the child from either natural parent affects the child ad-
versely. 15 7 Such parental visits will be held to be detrimental to
the child if the court feels the parent is unfit to associate with the
child or if the parent has severe mental or moral deficiencies which
are a grave threat to the child's welfare; 5 8 however, abandonment
of the child is not a sufficient reason for denying a parent visita-
vania statute on this subject is § 3(b), Proposed Uniform Act on Legiti-
macy in Krause, Bringing the Bastard Into the Great Society-A Proposed
Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1966). Such a statute
was introduced in New York but was defeated. Gursky v. Gursky, 39
Misc. 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
152. Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155
(1965). For a general discussion of visitation rights of the putative father,
see Harkins, Putative Father's Visitation Rights, 19 CLEW. ST. L. REv. 549
(1970).
153. Golembewski v. Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965).
154. Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 244, 146
A.2d 362, 363 (1958).
155. Commonwealth ex rel. Turner v. Strange, 179 Pa. Super. 83, 85-
86, 115 A.2d 885, 886 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Boschert v. Cook, 122
Pa. Super. 397, 400, 186 A. 229, 230 (1936).
156. Commonwealth ex rel. Meta v. Cinello, 217 Pa. Super. 94, 95, 268
A.2d 135, 136 (1970).
157. Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 244, 146
A.2d 362, 364 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Turner v. Strange, 179 Pa.
Super. 83, 86-87, 115 A.2d 885, 886 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown
v. Lane, 90 Pa. Super. 350, 352 (1927); Commonwealth ex rel. Manning
v. Manning, 89 Pa. Super. 301, 305 (1926).
158. Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 244, 146
A.2d 362, 363 (1958) (moral or mental deficiency); Commonwealth ex rel.
Turner v. Strange, 179 Pa. Super. 83, 86, 115 A.2d 885, 886 (1955) (unfit
to associate); Commonwealth ex rel. Heston v. Heston, 173 Pa. Super. 260,
262, 98 A.2d 477, 478 (1953) (mental or moral deficiency); Leonard v.
Leonard, 173 Pa. Super. 424, 426-27, 98 A.2d 638, 639 (1953) (unfit to asso-
ciate); Commonwealth ex rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 171 Pa. Super. 587,
593, 91 A.2d 379, 382 (1952) (undesirable influence).
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tion rights. 5 9
The courts feel so strongly that estangement is detrimental
to a child, that, if a child refuses to see the parent granted visitation
rights, some courts have compelled the person having custody of
the child to exercise parental authority to force the child to visit
with the parent. 160
The parent's right to visit his child has been defined to mean
"the right of the parent to go to see the child wherever he might
be, and does not include the right of the parent to take possession
of the child."' 61 However, in Skyanier v. Skyanier the court used
"right to visit" and "partial" custody synonomously even though
partial custody includes the right of the parent to take the child
away from home. 162 In Skyanier the parent who had been granted
partial custody took the child to see the paternal grandparents
and the grandparents were a disturbing influence on the child. 6
If the parent in this case had been granted only visitation rights
rather than partial custody this adverse influence on the child
could have been avoided because the visits to the grandparents
could not have occurred. 64 The courts can possibly avoid in many
cases the problem illustrated in Skyanier by specifying whether
the parent granted visitation rights is allowed to have partial cus-
tody or has been granted only the right to visit with the child at
the child's home. Courts feel that a better solution to the prob-
lem of visitation rights than a court imposed solution is stipula-
tions by the parties as to the frequency and extent of visitation
rights of the parent not receiving custody.
165
With the right of visitation now extended to putative fathers it
is submitted that most cases involving visitation rights of parents
of legitimate children will now also be applicable to situations in-
volving the right of the father to visit his illegitimate children.
159. Commonwealth ex rel. Turner v. Strange, 179 Pa. Super. 83, 86,
115 A.2d 885, 886 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Lane, 90 Pa.
Super. 350, 352 (1927).
160. Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 245, 146
A.2d 362, 364 (1958). The ruling in this case was based upon the welfare
of the child criterion. The court felt that estrangement of the parent from
his child should be avoided even if against the child's will.
161. Commonwealth ex rel. Rosequist v. Rosequist, 216 Pa. Super. 388,
391, 268 A.2d 140, 143 (1970).
162. 190. Pa. Super. 56, 151 A.2d 817 (1959).
163. Id.
164. See note 161 and accompanying text supra for the definition of
right to visit. See note 162 and accompanying text supra for the definition
of partial custody.
165. Commonwealth ex rel. McKee v. Reitz, 193 Pa. Super. 125, 131,
163 A.2d 908, 911 (1960).
In Golembewski v. Stanley' 66 the superior court held that
granting visitation rights to the putative father would be detri-
mental to the child's welfare because the child's illegitimacy would
be emphasized by the father's visits.' 67 The court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Rozanski' 68 was consistent with its holding in Go-
lembewski that the criterion to be used in deciding whether a pu-
tative father should be granted visitation rights is the child's wel-
fare, but overruled the Golembewski decision that granting a pu-
tative father visitation rights is always detrimental to the child's
welfare.169
To state as a matter of law that the visits of a putative
father are always detrimental to the illegitimate child's
best interests is to exalt rule over reality. This approach
ignores the growing recognition in our courts and in courts
throughout the nation, of the need to determine the welfare
of each child in light of his own particular needs and cir-
cumstances.
The putative father may, in many itance, instill
the child a sense of stability. He may develop qualities
in the child which the mother is uninterested, unwilling,
or incapable of developing. To the extent that he can per-
form such a valuable service, his presence becomes exceed-
ingly important. Certainly, to the illegitimate child, the
father who takes the time to visit is not putative.
170
The mother's prejudices, or the possible adverse effect of the
putative father's visits on the mother's future marital plans are
unimportant factors because the child's welfare is determina-
tive. 71 The fact that the child is illegitimate rather than legitimate
also should be irrelevant today because of the Rozanski decision.
Another positive effect of allowing the putative father to visit
his illegitimate child is that the father can evaluate how well his
support payments are being utilized. 72 Because visitation rights
are always temporary the rights may be withdrawn if the court
feels the visits are detrimental to the child's welfare.
173
166. 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965).
167. Id. at 104, 208 A.2d at 51.
168. 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965).
169. Id. at 402, 213 A.2d at 156-57.
170. Id. at 402, 213 A.2d at 157. The finding of a sociological study,
E.G. STmKER, THEi MoraER's SONS (1951) supports this court's view that
a father's companionship can be beneficial to a male child. The study
found that overexposure of a young boy to his mother may inhibit his
development of masculine traits.
171. Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 404, 213 A.2d 155,
158 (1965).
172. Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 137, 85 A. 816, 817 (1913).
173. Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 405, 213 A.2d 155,
158 (1965). The court also felt that if the mother marries and she and
her new husband wish to adopt the child, then the visitation rights of the
putative father could possibly be withdrawn, if the court feels withdrawal





Recently in Roe v. Wade 17 4 the United States Supreme Court
ruled that during the first trimester of a pregnancy the abortion
decision is a matter to be decided by the woman and her doctor.
175
In discussing any possible rights the father of the fetus may have
in the decision to terminate the pregnancy the Court stated that
"[n]either in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton"76 do we discuss
the father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in
the abortion decision.
1 77
A putative father of an unborn illegitimate child recently re-
quested state aid to prevent a woman from having an abortion
performed. 78 The putative father of the unborn child argued that
he had a right to participate in the abortion decision but the Flor-
ida court in this case of first impression ruled for the woman.179
The court felt any right the potential putative father may have in
the fetus is "subservient to the health of the pregnant woman and
potentiality of human life." 180 The court also dismissed as without
merits the putative father's argument that by participating in the
sex act the woman had waived her right to privacy including her
right to an abortion, reasoning that the mother's right to an
abortion was separate from the act of conception. 81
The argument that by deciding to have an abortion performed
the mother demonstrated her unfitness as a mother, and had aban-
doned the fetus were rejected by the court as questions of morality
settled by the Roe v. Wade decision' 82 and that regardless of
whether the court felt these arguments had merit, these arguments
must "yield to the paramount considerations of the preservation
and protection of maternal health.'
8 3
The court in Jones v. Smith" 4 took cognizance of Stanley v. Ii-
linois" 5 and the many articles' 86 dealing with the expanding rights
174. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
175. Id. at 163.
176. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
177. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973).
178. Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973).
179. Id. at 340.
180. Id. at 341.
181. Id. at 342-43.
182. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
183. Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 343 (Fla. App. 1973).
184. 278 So. 2d 339, 343 (Fla. App. 1973).
185. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court held that a putative father is enti-
tled to a dependency hearing on his fitness as a parent before a state may
of the putative father, but was "unable to conclude that such ex-
pansion is sufficiently broad as to embrace any right to prevent
termination of pregnancy."'18
B. Analysis
The argument that Stanley v. Illinois vests in the putative
father certain rights in his illegitimate child, which include the
right to prevent an abortion, seems to be an ineffective argument
despite Chief Justice Burger's dissenting prediction that the Court
in Stanley had "embarked on a novel concept of the natural law
for unwed fathers that could well have strange boundaries as yet
undiscernable."5 8 The Stanley decision did not hold that the
putative father has a "fundamental right" in his illegitimate child
but only held that a putative father was "entitled to a hearing on
his fitness as a parent before his [illegitimate] children [can be]
taken from him," and that denial of such a hearing is a violation of
ul protection ad A .1.. 89 T"..... . . i
tq~.1jJULt.IUI LA( UVL4 j1f. V cC. aJ, wv ~* oman's right to
choose whether to have an abortion performed has been held to be
a fundamental right of privacy during the first trimester of a preg-
nancy. 190 Therefore, it seems that in order for the putative father
to be able to invoke state aid to prevent an abortion he would have
to convince the court that he has a fundamental right to protect
the life of the fetus from the time of conception.' 9' The probabil-
ity seems remote that a court would hold that the father has such
a right to prevent an abortion when the state, which is the legal
guardian of all children, cannot prevent the abortion in the first
trimester. 92 This improbability is even stronger in states which
hold that the putative father is not even legally related to his ille-
take custody of his illegitimate children upon the death of their mother.
This case has been referred to in many articles as a possible precedent
for greatly expanding the rights of putative fathers. E.g., 61 ILL. B.J.
(1973); 4 LOYOLA U. L.J. 176 (1973); 7 Su. U. L. REv. 159 (1972); 21 DE-
PAUL L. REV. 1036 (1972); 34 U. PrrT L. REv. 303 (1972).
186. See articles cited at note 12 supra.
187. Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 344 (Fla. App. 1973).
188. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 445, 668 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
189. Id. at 649. The petitioner in Stanley was an unwed father who
had lived intermittently for 18 years with a woman during which time
they had three children. Upon the woman's death the three children be-
came wards of the state. A dependency hearing was held which resulted
in the children being placed with court-appointed guardians. The petition-
er's fitness as a parent was not considered relevant by the court and there-
fore was not an issue at the hearing.
190. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
191. To support this proposition the putative father of the unborn child
could refer to: Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (parenthood
is a property right protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation is a basic civil
right of man); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (rights to con-
ceive and raise one's children are essential rights).
192. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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gitimate child. 193 The chances seem stronger that a father of an
unborn legitimate child may be granted a right to prevent an abor-
tion because the father would be exercising his traditional role of
protecting a member, at least a potential member, of the legal fam-
ily unit. If the right to prevent an abortion is granted to the
father of an unborn legitimate child then this right may be
granted to the father of an unborn illegitimate child, if the classi-
fication of illegitimacy is ever held to be a "suspect classifica-
tion."194
VI. ADOPTION
The law of adoption in. Pennsylvania is entirely statutory'05
and in compliance with legislative intent the courts construe the
adoption statutes strictly. 196
Any individual can petition for the adoption of a child;19 7 how-
ever, a parent cannot adopt his or her legitimate or legitimated
child.198 In adoption proceedings the best welfare of the child is
considered to be controlling only after the statutory requirements
to obtain all necessary consents have been met or the circumstances
are such that no consent is required. 99
If the mother has custody of the illegitimate child the only
consent required in the adoption of the illegitimate child is the
consent of the natural mother. 200  The natural mother may with-
193. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972) holds that an ilegiti-
mate child is the child of its mother but not of its father for purposes
of descent.
194. See note 256 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of sus-
pect classifications.
195. Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358, 362 (1879).
196. In re Adoption of Maisels, 395 Pa. 329, 332, 149 A.2d 38, 39 (1958).
But see In re McQuiston's Adoption, 238 Pa. 304, 310, 86 A. 205, 207 (1913)
which advocates a liberal construction of adoption statutes.
197. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 202 (Supp. 1972). The proper court to
handle an adoption proceeding is the court of common pleas in each
county. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 201 (Supp. 1972).
198. Adoption of Baltosser, 63 Pa. D. & C. 498, 500 (O.C. Perry 1949).
Whether a father may adopt his illegitimate child is unanswered by this
court.
For a discussion of an attempt by the mother of an illegitimate child
to adopt her illegitimate child, see Vannini, Application By a Mother To
Adopt Her Illegitimate Child, 12 CAN. B.J. 137 (1969).
199. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 413, 414 (Supp. 1973) covers when con-
sents are not required. See also In re Dougherty's Adoption, 358 Pa. 620,
623, 58 A.2d 77, 80 (1948); In re Schwab's Adoption, 355 Pa. 534, 537, 50
A.2d 504, 507-08 (1947).
200. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411(3) (Supp. 1973). Whether this stat-
ute's exclusion of the putative father from the class of persons whose con-
draw such consent at any time prior to or during the hearing upon
the petition for adoption.201 The omission of a requirement for the
putative father's consent was intentional, not an oversight or mis-
take, because the clause in the repealed statute2°2 requiring the
consent of the putative father if he had acknowled the child was
deleted from the new adoption statute.203 The only situation in
which the consent of the putative father is required is if the puta-
tive father has custody,20 4 which is very seldom the case unless the
mother is deceased. Because the consent of the putative father
is not required he need not be given any notice that his illegiti-
mate child is being adopted. 20 5  The putative father's relation to
an adoption proceeding is succinctly stated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court: "[I] n an adoption proceeding .the putative father
is not a party, is given no notice, is not named or described in the
petition, and need not consent to the adoption or be proved to
have abandoned the child.
20 6
One key reason for not including the putative father in the
adoption proceeding is to facilitate adoption of illegitimate chil-
dren. 207 An alternative to the present complete exclusion of the
putative father from the adoption proceeding would be to give
the putative father notice of the adoption proceeding and allow
him to be heard prior to the proceeding. Then the judge could
decide, on the basis of the welfare of the child, whether to give
the putative father custody of the illegitimate child, or to allow
the adoption to proceed. This proceedure would add no uncer-
sent is required for the adoption of an illegitimate child is a valid exclu-
sion in light of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Pennsylvania's
Equal Rights Amendment, PA. CONST. art. I, § 27, is discussed in notes
250-266 and 270-274 and accompanying text infra.
201. In re Adoption of Stone, 398 Pa. 190, 194, 156 A.2d 808, 810 (1960).
202. Act of June 30, 1917, P.L. 1180, § 2 [1947] (repealed 1971).
However, the consent of the father of a legitimate child is required before
that child may be adopted. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 2 (Supp. 1973).
203. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411 (Supp. 1973).
204. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411(5) (Supp. 1973).
205. In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W. 126, 130 (1965). Although
this is a Minnesota court's holding it is apparent from PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 2 (Supp. 1973) that the Pennsylvania Legislature's intent is to
exclude the father of an illegitimate child from the adoption proceeding
so the father is probably not required to be given notice in Pennsylvania
either. In one Pennsylvania case, Swartwood's Adoption, 19 Pa. Dist. 819
(Wyoming 1909), the court held that the putative father was entitled to
notice but this holding is probably invalid today due to PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 2 (Supp. 1973). For a discussion of a putative father's right to
notice, see 68 U. ILL. L.F. 232 (1968).
206. In re Adoption of Wischmann, 428 Pa. 327, 330, 237 A.2d 205, 207
(1968). Although this case was decided prior to the new adoption law
its assessment of the father's role in the adoption proceeding is still valid
today.
207. In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126, 131 (1965). How-
ever, if the putative father marries the mother then his consent is required
if the decree terminating the mother's parental rights was issued after the
marriage. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411(3) (Supp. 1973).
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tainty to adoption proceedings because it could be done after the
mother has agreed to allow her child to be adopted, yet prior to any
selection of the prospective adopting parents. Failure of the father
to appear would be a waiver by him of any further interest in the
child. The putative father's consent would still not be required,
but notice to him would be required, and a right to be heard would
be granted.2 08
The mother of an illegitimate child may petition the court to
relinquish all her parental rights in the illegitimate child to an
agency,209 or to an adult intending to adopt the child. 210 This re-
linquishment is final and once the decree is entered, the mother's
consent for adoption is no longer required.2 11 The relinquish-
ment is held to be irrevocable in order to achieve finality and to
sever the ties between the natural mother and her child in order to
give more stability to the adoption process.
2 12
The natural mother's parental rights in her illegitimate child
may also be involuntarily terminated on the ground that her con-
duct for at least six months evidenced a settled purpose to relin-
quish parental claims to her child, or a failure to perform parental
duties, or a repeated and continued incapacity to provide the child
with parental care.
213
208. Alternative approaches to the question of whether the putative
father's consent should be required have been adopted in other states.
Consent of the father of an illegitimate child is required by the following
statutes if paternity has been established: ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958);
ORE. Rzv. STAT. § 109.080 (1971).
If paternity has been established or the father has acknowledged the
illegitimate child prior to the adoption proceeding the consent of the father
is required. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (Supp. 1973). If the father's
consent is required then personal notice must be given to the father.
ARiz. Rn'. STAT. ANN. § 8-111 (Supp. 1973).
One statute requires the father's consent if paternity has been judi-
cially established, the father has contributed to the support of the child
and the father's address is known or can be ascertained by expenditure
of not more than five dollars. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Supp. 1973).
209. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 301 (Supp. 1973).
210. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 302 (Supp. 1973).
211. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 414 (Supp. 1973). After the parent's con-
sent is no longer required the welfare of the child becomes the court's
guiding factor. Davies Adoption Case, 353 Pa. 579, 587, 46 A.2d 252, 256
(1959).
212. In re Watson, 450 Pa. 579, 584, 301 A.2d 861, 864 (1973).
213. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311 (Supp. 1973). To guard against the
possibility of a court decision holding that a putative father's consent is
required in the adoption proceeding the attorney for the adopting parents
can include the language of this statute in the adoption proceeding docu-
ments and request that the court make a ruling that the putative father
has relinquished his parental rights.
Cases prior to the passage of this statute had attempted to determine
The parent-child relationship is not disturbed by an involun-
tary termination of parental rights unless the abuse by the parent
is continued abuse, not a single act of abuse. 21 4 The petition to
terminate parental rights in an illegitimate child, may be brought
by an agency, or the person having custody of the child2 15 but
not by the putative father, unless he is also the person having
custody.
216
VII. INHERITANCE AND RECOVERY UNDER STATUTES
"For purposes of descent by, from and through a person born
out of wedlock, he shall be considered the child of his mother but
not of his father. ' 217 Thus the legislature has explicitly manifested
its intent not to allow illegitimate children and their father to in-
herit from or through each other.218  However, if the illegitimate
child's parents marry subsequent to his birth then he is legitimated
for the purposes of descent and inherits equally with any other
legmtiate chi1d of his parents. 219  Acknowledgment of the illegiti-
if the parent had evidenced a settled intent to relinquish parental rights
forever and had determined certain actions which did evidence such an
intent and certain actions which did not evidence such an intent. A par-
ent's consent to adoption does not evidence such an intent unless other
factors are also present which demonstrate a settled intent. In re Adop-
tion of Stone, 398 Pa. 190, 194, 156 A.2d 808, 810 (1960). Temporarily leav-
ing the child with a third party for the welfare of the child does not evi-
dence a settled intent. Wanner v. Williams, 117 Pa. Super. 59, 61, 177 A.
329, 330 (1935). Leaving the child with a hospital and signing a surrender
statement does evidence a settled intent. In re McCann's Adoption, 104
Pa. Super. 196, 210, 159 A. 334, 339 (1932). Failure to support the child
is evidence of such a settled intent but is not determinative without other
evidence. In re Adoption of Underwood, 31 West L.J. 171, 173 (Pa. O.C.
1950).
214. Jones Appeal, 449 Pa. 543, 547, 297 A.2d 117, 119 (1972). In this
case the single act of abuse by the mother was aiding in the rape of her
fourteen year old daughter, yet the court refused to involuntarily terminate
her parental rights in her seven children because the abuse was not "con-
tinued." For other cases where the courts interpret and utilize PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, § 311 (Supp. 1973), see Loar Adoption, 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 618
(C.P. Mercer 1972); Casteel Adoption, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 307 (C.P. Fay.
1972).
215. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312 (Supp. 1973).
216. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312 (Supp. 1973).
217. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2D, § 2107 (Supp. 1972). In Labine v. Vin-
cent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), the Court held that state intestacy laws which
differentiate between a father's legitimate and illegitimate children are
constitutionally valid because such statutory classifications have a rational
relation to a valid state interest. For an excellent discussion of Labine
v. Vincent see Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates, Inheritance, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DIcK. L. Rxv. 377 (1971).
218. Manfredi's Estate, 399 Pa. 285, 291, 159 A.2d 697, 700 (1960);
Wharton's Estate, 218 Pa. 296, 297, 67 A. 414, 415 (1907). At common law
the illegitimate child and its father could not inherit from or through each
other either. McGunnicle v. McKee,77 Pa. 81, 84 (1875).
219. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972). Notice in this statute
that there is no requirement for cohabitation as there was in PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 48, § 167 (Supp. 1973) which deals with legitimation.
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mate child by the father is not sufficient to allow the illegitimate
child to inherit from the father if the father dies intestate. 220 If a
devise is made to a man's "children" in a will 221 or in a convey-
ance222 the word "children" does not include illegitimate children.
This construction of the word "children" is adhered to by the courts,
even if it thwarts the testator's intent, in order to further the gen-
eral policy of the law toward illegitimates.
22s
Illegitimate children inherit through descent from their
mother equally with her legitimate children.224 The courts of
Pennsylvania have held in the past that illegitimate children could
inherit from their mother but not through their mother from a
third person.22 5 However, the present statutes226 contain no such
restriction. Illegitimates have not always had capacity to inherit
from other illegitimate children born of the same mother but to-
day they do have such capacity.227 Because the illegitimate child
220. Mann's Estate, 24 Leh. L.J. 261, 264 (Pa. O.C. 1951). In California
an illegitimate child can inherit from its father as an heir if the father
acknowledges the child in writing. CAL. INon. CODE § 255 (West Supp.
1973).
221. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2514 (Supp. 1972).
222. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6114 (Supp. 1972). However, if the
devise is to a woman's children her illegitimate children take equally with
her legitimate children. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972).
223. In re Schriver's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 314, 317, 48 A.2d 52, 53
(1946).
224. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972). As early as 1855
Pennsylvania held by statute that an illegitimate child and its mother had
the capacity to inherit from each other. Act of April 27, 1855, P.L. 368,
§ 3 [1855] (repealed 1917).
225. In re Ree's Estate, 166 Pa. 498, 499, 31 A. 254, 254-55 (1895); Ap-
peal of Grubb, 58 Pa. 55, 63 (1868).
226. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972), see note 217 and ac-
companying text supra; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2514 (Supp. 1972), see
note 221 and accompanying text supra; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6114
(Supp. 1972), see note 222 and accompanying text supra.
The illegitimate gradually through statute was given capacity to in-
herit from its natural mother on an equal basis with the mother's legiti-
mate children. In 1897 the illegitimate child, natural mother, and maternal
grandmother were given the capacity to inherit from each other as heirs.
Act of June 14, 1897, P.L. 142, § 1 [1897] (repealed 1917). The illegiti-
mate's capacity to inherit was extended to include maternal ancestors in
1917. Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 429, § 15 [1917] (repealed 1947).
The illegitimate can inherit from his mother equally with legitimate
children with no legal obstacles. Thompson v. Delaware, I. & W. R.R.
Co., 41 Pa. Super. 617, 625 (1910).
227. Because PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972) makes illegiti-
mate children the children of their mother for purposes of inheritance ille-
gitimate children may inherit from each other as brother and sister. The
Act of June 5, 1883, P.L. 88, § 1 [1883] (repealed 1917) gave illegitimate
children the capacity to inherit personal property from each other and the
Act of June 14, 1897, P.L. 142, § 1 [1897] (repealed 1917) extended this
capacity to include realty.
has a duty to support his mother,228 the illegitimate is the child of
the mother for purposes of inheritance, 29 and the mother has a
prima facie right to custody of her illegitimate child, it can be in-
ferred that the mother of an illegitimate child has a right to his
earnings and services.
23 0
Children are entitled to recover damages for the wrongful
death of a parent in the same "proportion they would take his or
her personal estate in case of intestacy." 2 1  Pennsylvania courts
have held that illegitimate children could not recover for the wrong-
ful death of a parent,232 but in Levy v. Louisiana23 3 the United
States Supreme Court held that an illegitimate child could not be
barred by a state statute from recovering damages for the wrong-
ful death of his mother based on the classification of illegitimacy.
Levy thus allows illegitimate chillren to recover damages for the
wrongful death of their mother in Pennsylvania. However,
whether illegitimates now have a right to recover damages for the
wrongful death of their father in Pennsylvania is unclear in light
of the statute's language 23 4 and the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Labine v. Vincent2 5 which clarified the Levy de-
cision. In Pennsylvania illegitimate children possibly cannot re-
cover damages for the wrongful death of their father because
wrongful death recovery is limited by the intestacy statute
23 6
and under this statute illegitimates inherit nothing from their
father. Because differentiation between illegitimates and legiti-
mates in state intestacy statutes is valid23 7 denial of wrongful
death damages to illegitimates in Pennsylvania for the death of
their father will be held to be valid or invalid on the basis of
whether the courts feel utilization of an intestacy statute is a
proper method of determining recovery of wrongful death bene-
fits in light of Levy. 238 In order to rectify this possible denial of
228. Commonwealth v. Gross, 35 York 93, 94 (Pa. Q.S. 1921).
229. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972).
230. California gives the mother of an illegitimate this right by stat-
ute. CAL. CrV. CODE § 200 (West 1954).
231. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1602 (1953).
232. Bullock v. Sinclair Refining Co., 160 F. Supp. 300, 302 (E.D. Pa.
1958); Molz v. Hansell, 115 Pa. Super. 338, 342, 175 A. 880, 881 (1934).
233. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Glona v. Am. Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968) the court held that the mother could not be barred
by a state statute from recovering damages for the wrongful death of her
illegitimate child. Levy and GLona are discussed in Hood, Another Look
at Levy and Glona, 19 LA. B.J. 135 (1971).
234. See note 231 and accompanying text supra.
235. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). For a discussion of this decision and its sig-
nificance see note 217 and accompanying text supTa.
236. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107 (Supp. 1972). This statute is dis-
cussed in note 217 and accompanying text supra.
237. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). See note 217 and accom-
panying text supra.
238. The court in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 (1971) stated
that "Levy did not say and cannot fairly be read to say that a state can
never treat an illegitimate child differently from legitimate offspring."
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recovery the Pennsylvania Legislature could amend the present
statute2 3 9 to enable illegitimates to recover wrongful death dam-
ages due to the wrongful death of their father.
2 40
The children of a deceased father are entitled to a portion of
the payments of Workmen's Compensation benefits.2 41 However,
Pennsylvania courts have excluded illegitimate children from the
classification of "children" and illegitimate children may only re-
ceive benefits if they were a member of the father's household at
the time of his death and the father stood in loco parentis to the il-
legitimate child.2 42 A legitimate child is entitled to Workmen's
Compensation benefits because of his status and there is no need to
show that the legitimate child was dependent on the father.248 How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court recently held that it was
a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to deny Workmen's Compensation benefits to an illegitimate
child based on the classification of illegitimacy.2 44 The Court in
Weber ?. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,245 however, held
that a state could validly distinguish between children based upon
their dependency on the father. The Pennsylvania scheme of ex-
cluding the illegitimate child unless he meets two requirements246
yet allowing the legitimate child to recover based merely upon his
status seems violative of the decision in Weber. The statute
24 7
need not be changed in order to comply with the Weber decision
because the word "child" is used in the statute without restricting
it to mean only legitimate children. The courts need only change
their judicial construction of the word "child" to include both legi-
timate and illegitimate children. Then the courts can constitu-
239. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1602 (1953).
240. The court in Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co., 407 Pa. 78, 89, 179 A.2d
202, 208 (1962) makes an indirect appeal to the legislature to make such
a change but none has been made by the legislature. The issue of whether
an illegitimate child should recover for the wrongful death of his father
is discussed in 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 190 (1971).
241. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 562 (Supp. 1973).
242. Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co., 407 Pa. 78, 85, 179 A.2d 202, 206
(1962); Cairgle v. Am. Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249,
255, 77 A.2d 439, 442 (1951); Balanti v. Stineman Coal and Coke Co., 131
Pa. Super. 344, 346, 200 A. 236, 237 (1938). For a discussion of the rights
of illegitimates under federal statutes, see Note, The Rights of Illegitimates
Under Federal Statutes, 76 HAav. L. REv. 337 (1962).
243. Mohan v. Publicker Industries, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 581, 583, 198
A.2d 326, 327 (1964).
244. Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
245. Id.
246. Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co., 407 Pa. 78, 85, 179 A.2d 202, 206
(1962).
247. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 562 (Supp. 1973).
tionally exclude children using a test of dependency as long as
the test is applied similarly to both legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren. If an illegitimate child is included in the meaning of the
word "child" in the statute, illegitimate children could receive
Workmen's Compensation benefits without being required to meet
the burden of proof presently required by Pennsylvania courts.24
The court in Weber stated that posthumous illegitimate children
also cannot be excluded due to the fact that they are illegitimate if
posthumous legitimate children are included within the statute's
coverage.
24e
IX. EFFECT OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The effect of the equal protection clause and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment upon the area of the law deal-
ing with the rights, duties and liabilities of the illegitimate child,
natural mother and putative father has been extensively covered
in other articles. 250 Therefore, the coverage of it in this article will
be condensed with the emphasis on the equal protection clause's
possible effect on certain segments of Pennsylvania law.
In deciding if a statutory classification violates the equal pro-
tection clause the court will use either of two tests. The most
frequently used test, the "rational relation" test,25 1 requires that
the classification must "bear some rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose"2 2 and be "founded upon reason and logic.
'25
3
Reducing the caseload of the courts and expediting litigation by
eliminating hearings on the merits have been held to be proper
state interests but are subordinate to an individual's right to equal
protection of the law.25 4 The rational relation test does not sub-
ject a state statute to an extremely strict scrutiny and the Penn-
sylvania statutes relating to illegitimates covered previously in
this article could probably pass the rational relation test.2 5 5
248. See note 242 and accompanying text supra for coverage of these
requirements. These requirements would not be needed because illegiti-
mates would be included within the scope of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 562
(Supp. 1973) by their inclusion in the classification "child" without any
need to use the present requirements.
249. Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169 n.7 (1972).
250. See note 3 supra.
251. The rational relation test was used in the following cases: Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (dissenting opinion) (abortion); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (distribution of contraceptives); Glona v.
American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful death);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death); Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (drug addict).
252. Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
253. Commonwealth ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 325 Pa. 305, 307, 188 A.
841, 842 (1937).
254. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
255. Schafrick Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative
Father's Parental Rights, 7 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1973). Current state laws have
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A stricter test, the "compelling state interest" test, is used by
courts whenever the classification is "suspect"2 56 or if a "funda-
mental right"25 7 is involved. If this test is used the state must es-
tablish that there is a "compelling state interest" for imposing the
classification. 258  The classifications of illegitimates and parents of
illegitimates have not been declared suspect classifications.
259
The interest of the father in his illegitimate child' has been held to
warrant deference and protection unless there is a "powerful coun-
tervailing interest,"2 60 but has not been deemed a fundamental
right. The right of a child to receive support from his father has
been held to be "essential" 261 but not "fundamental." If the clas-
sifications of illegitimate children, parents of illegitimate children
and classifications based upon sex were held to be "suspect" the
mandatory use of the "compelling state interest" test would prob-
ably result in a ruling that the sections of Pennsylvania law re-
lating to illegitimacy based upon these classifications are violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and are
thus unconstitutional.
26 2
a conceivable basis supporting them and would pass the rational relation
test. Id. at 83.
256. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race is a suspect
classification); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race is a sus-
pect classification); Qyama v. California, 332 U.S. 663 (1940) (ancestry is
a suspect classification).
257. Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy is
fundamental right); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting is a
fundamental right).
258. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). "Where certain 'fundamental
rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' . . . and that legis-
lative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake." Id. at 155.
259. For a discussion of the possibility of sex being held to be a sus-
pect classification see notes 265-274 and accompanying text infra.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) four justices held that
sex is a suspect classification. However due to the fact that a majority of
the Supreme Court did not hold sex to be inherently suspect, this decision
is not a binding precedent for the courts at this time.
260. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
261. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). A child's right to a familial
relationship with his father has been advocated as a fundamental right.
Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967).
The courts have not yet agreed with this author.
262. Schafrick, Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative
Father's Parental Rights, 7 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1973). Almost every classifica-
tion can meet the rational relation test; few can withstand the strict scru-
tiny of the compelling state interest standard. Id. at 83.
However, in Marcus, Equal Protection: Custody of the Illegitimate
Child, 11 J. FAM. L. 1, 39 (1971) the author feels that the classification
of parents of illegitimates could withstand even the "compelling state in-
terest" test.
Parenthood of a legitimate child has been held to be a prop-
erty right protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 63 Therefore, if the classification as parent of an il-
legitimate is ruled invalid, then a putative father's right of parent-
hood would probably be held to be violated by Pennsylvania's ex-
clusion of him from the adoption proceeding involving his illegit-
imate child.
26 4
X. EFFECT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA EQUAL RIGHTS AmENDIENT
The Pennsylvania Legislature recently enacted an Equal Rights
Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution which reads: "Prohi-
bition against denial or abridgment of equality of rights because
of sex. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex
of the individual. '265 Through this amendment the Pennsylvania
Legislature made sex an "impermissible classification" upon which
rights cannot be "arbitrarily and capriciously" denied.26  Courts
have relied upon this amendment to declare as unconstitutional
Pennsylvania's divorce from bed and board statute,26 7 the granting
of recovery for loss of consortium to the husband but not the
wife268 and the granting of the right to receive costs pendente lite
only to the wife.
269
The test to use in determining whether rights are being granted
or restricted in violation of the Equal Rights Amendment is whether
the rights are granted exclusively to one sex with no mutuality of
rights to both sexes. 27 0 There is no exception for domestic rela-
tions made in the amendment 271 so the amendment will apply to
all areas of the law pertaining to illegitimacy in Pennsylvania. The
263. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965).
264. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) the Court held that a
putative father's right to due process of law had been violated by the
state's failure to grant him a hearing on his fitness as a parent before
the state took custody of his illegitimate children.
265. PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 27. Compare the Pennsylvania Equal Rights
Amendment with the language of Section 1, Proposed Equal Rights
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, H. R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) which states: Equality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.
266. Lukens v. Lukens, 224 Pa. Super. 227, 229, 303 A.2d 522, 523
(1973); Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitt L.J. 183 (Pa. C.P. 1972). The basic prin-
ciple of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a
permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men.
Id. at 194.
267. Kehl v. Kehl, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 164 (C.P. Alleg. 1972).
268. Hopkins v. Blanco, 224 Pa. Super. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973).
269. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973).
270. Id. This test can be referred to as the "exclusiveness" or '"mu-
tuality of rights" test.
271. Id.; Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843,
846 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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prima facie right of the mother to custody of her illegitimate child
seems very likely to be held to be in violation of the Equal Rights
Amendment.27 2 Other areas where the Equal Rights Amendment
may have a profound effect are Pennsylvania's exclusion of the
putative father from his illegitimate child's adoption proceeding
and Pennsylvania's holding that the illegitimate child is the child
of the mother but not the father for inheritance purposes. 2 78 If the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopts a test for determining viola-
tions of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment which is less
rigorous than the test in Wiegand v. Wiegand 274 and similar to the
equal protection tests used in cases where the fourteenth amend-
ment is involved, it seems that the Pennsylvania Legislature's pas-
sage of the Equal Rights Amendment at the very least expresses
legislative intent to make sex a "suspect classification" requiring
the use of the more rigorous "compelling state interest" test. What
the actual effect of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment
will be in the area of illegitimacy, however, remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
This article has dealt with the rights, duties and liabilities of
the illegitimate child, the natural mother, and the putative father
in Pennsylvania. Society has long burdened the illegitimate with
legal liabilities for the stated purpose of encouraging marriage
and legitimacy. However, it is submitted that the time has arrived
for Pennsylvania courts and the Pennsylvania Legislature to reject
this relegation of the illegitimate to a legally inferior position in
our society. Punishing the illegitimate child can easily be recog-
nized as an ineffective method of preventing illegitimacy by deter-
ring the natural father and mother from participating in the sex
act. By adopting some or all of the changes discussed in this arti-
272. Brown, Emberson, Falk and Freedman, Equal Rights Amendment:
A Constitutional Basis For Equal Rights For Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 953
(1971). The Equal Rights Amendment would prohibit both statutory and
common law presumptions about which parent was the proper guardian
based on the sex of the parent.
[T] he fact that in our present society members of one sex are
more likely to be found in a particular activity or to perform a
particular function does not allow the law to fix legal rights by
virtue of a membership in that sex. In short, sex is a prohibited
classification.
Id. at 889.
273. For a discussion of the possible effect of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment on the support law in Pennsylvania see Comment, The Support Law
and the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania, 77 DicK. L. REv. 254
(1973).
274. 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973).
cle the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania can demonstrate its realiza-
tion of the fact that the prejudicial treatment of the illegitimate in
our society is an anachronism in our law which has no place in a so-
ciety where acceptance of an individual should be based upon
what qualities the person possesses, not upon an artificial status
given him at birth.
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